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Introduction: 
The Promises We Keep: President Ford’s Leadership at the Helsinki Conference 
 
 Gerald R. Ford served in the United States Congress for almost a quarter of a century and 
his greatest aspiration was to become the Speaker of the House of Representatives.  Yet in 1974, 
he became president of the United States during one of the most challenging times in the nation’s 
history. Domestically, the economy was suffering from rampant inflation and the highest 
unemployment since the Great Depression. Internationally, U.S. relationships were strained with 
Cold War rival, the Soviet Union. Public and congressional faith in the executive branch’s ability 
to resolve these challenges had been shattered by the Vietnam War and Watergate crises. Given 
the magnitude of the nation’s problems, coupled with the fact that he would face an election in 
two short years, President Ford could have understandably focused on a course of action to 
resolve domestic issues and bolster his own image at home. Instead, he pursued a course of 
action to resolve international issues and elevate America’s image in the world.  
 Gerald Ford ascended to the presidency with a steadfast belief that America was duty 
bound to play a prominent global leadership role. In his first foreign policy address to a joint 
session of Congress he declared, “The leadership of the United States of America, since the end 
of World War Two, has sustained and advanced the security, well-being, and freedom of 
millions of human beings besides ourselves.”1 To fulfill America’s demanding responsibility, 
President Ford pursued an ambitious and visible foreign policy. Among his most controversial 
foreign policy decisions was to attend the 1975 Conference on European Security and 
Cooperation in Helsinki and sign its Final Act. His decision to attend was met with severe public, 
congressional, and media opposition who feared the Final Act cemented Soviet hegemony over 
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Eastern Europe. The outcome of the Helsinki Conference remained controversial through the 
remainder of Ford’s presidency. In fact, he did not count the Helsinki accords among his 
administration’s accomplishments in his final State of the Union Address on January 12, 1977. 
And yet in an interview conducted fifteen years later, Ford cited the Helsinki accords as one of 
the greatest accomplishments of his presidency.
2
 The purpose of my thesis is to explore the 
leadership characteristics Ford developed in his career, examine his leadership role at the 
Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation as president, and assess the Final 
Act’s ultimate impact. First, I will argue that Gerald Ford’s military and twenty-five year 
congressional experiences shaped the principles, strengths, and weaknesses with which he led 
during the Helsinki Conference. Second, I will argue that President Ford played a visible and 
courageous leadership role under severe domestic opposition during the Helsinki Conference that 
gave the Final Act international credibility. Finally, I will argue that in the short term, Ford’s 
support of the Helsinki Final Act created ill-will that contributed to his 1976 presidential election 
loss, but established the foundation of human rights, self-determination, and trade expansion 
upon which Eastern bloc democratization and German re-unification were built at the close of 
the Cold War. My thesis is that Gerald Ford established the leadership qualities during his unique 
experiences in the military and Congress that guided his call for peaceful freedom at the Helsinki 
Conference and resulted in short term personal political loss, but long term foreign policy 
success.      
 Chapter one will analyze five beliefs and strengths Gerald Ford developed during his 
military and congressional career that were the foundation of his leadership at the Helsinki 
Conference. First, Ford developed a strong internationalist belief. This was sparked by his World 
War II military service and further developed in his congressional roles in funding Cold War 
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initiatives, his co-authorship of the Republican stance on the Vietnam War, and his visit as 
House Minority Leader to Communist China. Second, Ford developed an ardent belief in peace 
through strength. This was developed through his roles on the Appropriations Defense Sub-
Committee as well as personal visits to South East Asia. Third, Ford developed the ability to lead 
courageously in the face of opposition. This quality was initially forged in his ability to secure a 
seat on the Appropriations Committee and to successfully challenge for the House Minority 
Leader role, and was later honed during his vocal opposition to President Johnson’s Vietnam 
War policy. Fourth, Ford developed the skill of collaborative compromise through relationship 
building. This skill was developed in his work on the Democratic led Intelligence Appropriations 
Subcommittee, the intense debates in which he engaged as House Minority Leader during the 
Johnson administration and House Majority Leader during the Nixon administration. Fifth, Ford 
led with unquestionable integrity. This skill was honed with congressional colleagues in his 
experiences on several Appropriations Subcommittees, in his determination to reveal the truth 
about President Johnson’s misleading Vietnam War actions, and in the transparency he 
demonstrated in his vice presidential confirmation hearings.  
Despite these experiences, Ford failed to develop the skill of inspirational communication 
in his congressional career. This began in his years on the highly confidential work on the 
Appropriations Committee which required no communication and was later revealed in his 
inability to create the inspirational communication necessary to advance his initiatives as House 
Minority Leader. Taken together, these five leadership beliefs and strengths, along with his 
communication shortcoming, defined President Ford’s leadership at the Helsinki Conference. 
Research to identify the qualities that characterized Ford’s leadership at Helsinki 
included scholarly works supplemented with primary documents.  These scholarly works 
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included Yanek Mieczkowski’s Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s, James Cannon’s 
Time and Chance: Gerald Ford’s Appointment with History, Kenneth Thompson’s The Ford 
Presidency, John Robert Greene’s The Presidency of Gerald Ford, Thomas DeFrank’s Write it 
When I’m Gone, and Robert Peabody’s Leadership in Congress. Primary documents included 
Ford’s autobiography, A Time to Heal, The Library of Congress’s Analysis of the Philosophy and 
Voting Record of Representative Gerald R. Ford, Michael Doyle’s Gerald R. Ford Selected 
Speeches While in Congress, The Congressional Quarterly President Ford: The Man and His 
Record, and Ford’s newsletters to his Michigan constituents from the Ford Presidential Library.   
 Chapter Two will examine Ford’s leadership at the Helsinki Conference. First, I will 
define President Ford’s Cold War foreign policy and stance on the Helsinki accords in contrast 
with those of President Nixon. While President Ford was committed to advancing President 
Nixon’s policy of détente, Ford’s commitment to peace through strength and human rights 
resulted in a more forceful freedom and equality stance at Helsinki than the Soviet appeasement 
stance Nixon would likely have taken. Second, I will articulate the leadership challenges 
President Ford faced in executing this foreign policy. In the face of a severely struggling 
American economy and the government mistrust arising from the Vietnam War and Watergate, 
these challenges included an emerging isolationism, a cynical and critical media, and a power 
shift from the executive branch to the legislative branch. Fourth, I will discuss President Ford’s 
resolve to attend the Helsinki Conference in the face of serious opposition from vocal American 
citizens advocating for East European rights, from congressional challengers, and from the media 
who believed the Helsinki Final Act was meaningless.  
Having established this background, I will evaluate President Ford’s leadership during 
the Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation itself. First, I will discuss the 
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Helsinki accords negotiations overseen by Ford that resulted in collaborative compromises for 
greater human rights, self-determination, and arms reductions talks from the Soviet Union 
Second, I will examine the Helsinki Final Act that President Ford endorsed and signed to 
illuminate the groundbreaking nature of its self-determination, sovereign equality, and human 
rights principles.. Third, I will examine the collaborative personal diplomacy President Ford 
demonstrated in the unprecedented visits he held with Warsaw pact nations, the Soviet Union, 
and American allies. Fourth, I will examine President Ford’s speech in which he articulated 
America’s global leadership commitment to peace and urged the thirty-five signatory nations to 
uphold the promises of freedom and human rights written in the Final Act.  
 Research to assess President Ford’s Soviet foreign policy and his leadership at the 
Helsinki Conference focused on primary sources from collections at the Ford Presidential 
Library. The collection entitled “Gerald R. Ford, Presidency – Foreign Affairs and National 
Security” contained key documents including briefings from Ford’s National Security Council 
meetings where Soviet relations and the Helsinki Conference were discussed, Ford’s 
correspondence with foreign leaders, along with Ford’s Foreign Policy and State of the Union 
speeches to Congress. The newly published collection entitled “Kissinger Reports on the USSR” 
included memoranda of conversations of President Ford’s meetings with foreign leaders before 
and during the Helsinki Conference. This collection also contained vital State Department 
Bulletins that included content from the Helsinki Conference’s press releases, speeches, and the 
content of the Final Act. The collection entitled the “Ron Nessen Papers” included press 
memoranda and releases on Helsinki Conference related foreign policy and political issues. 
Additionally, I utilized Ford’s own account of the Helsinki Conference in his autobiography and 
Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin’s account from his book In Confidence: Moscow’s 
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Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents. Finally, I used scholarly works on the Ford 
presidency including John Robert Greene’s The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford, Yanek 
Mieczkowski’s Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s, and scholarly works on the 
partnership between Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger including Jussi Hanhimäki’s The 
Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, and William Burr’s The 
Kissinger Transcripts. 
 Chapter Three will examine the immediate term, short term, and long term impact of 
Ford’s leadership at the Helsinki Conference. First, I will assess President Ford’s failure to 
capitalize on the successful signing of the Helsinki Final Act with an inspirational message that 
could have secured popular domestic support for this accomplishment and prevented the loss he 
suffered in approval ratings that immediately followed the conference. Second, I will argue that 
the Helsinki accords proved to be a short term political liability for President Ford and played a 
role in his defeat during the 1976 presidential election. In the primary election, Ford faced 
intense competition from right-wing conservative challenger Ronald Reagan who sharply 
criticized Ford’s decision to sign the Helsinki Final Act as a spineless appeasement to the Soviet 
Union that subjugated Eastern Europe to Soviet tyranny. In the general election, Ford faced 
further criticism from Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter. Carter criticized the Helsinki accords 
as an American endorsement of the Soviet Union’s domination over Eastern Europe, and then 
further criticized Ford for pressing for greater human rights in the Final Act. But it was Ford’s 
own poor performance on a Helsinki question during the foreign policy debate where he 
unintentionally denied Soviet control over East Europe that proved most costly. While many 
factors contributed to Ford’s election defeat, the Helsinki accords played a critical role.  
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Finally, I will argue that the Helsinki accords proved to be a long term foreign policy 
success well beyond President Ford’s administration. The widely publicized Helsinki Final Act 
became the inspiration for dissident movements across Eastern Europe where “Helsinki Groups” 
formed to demand greater freedoms and rights. In the fifteen years that followed the original 
signing of the Final Act, the demands of these groups played a contributing role to the collapse 
of Communism and its replacement with the East European free elections that followed. 
Furthermore, the Helsinki agreements were expressly invoked by President George H.W. Bush 
and President Mikhail Gorbachev in the German reunification negotiations that resulted in 
Germany’s right to self-determine the alliance to which it would belong. What began as a bold 
decision by President Ford to sign a forward looking agreement in the face of personally costly 
opposition, ultimately contributed to the conclusion of the Cold War. 
   Research to assess the short and long term outcomes of the Helsinki accords included 
both primary and secondary sources. From the Ford Presidential Library, I researched the 
collection entitled “Selected Documents on the 1976 Presidential Campaign” that included 
Ford’s campaign strategy, debate briefings and transcripts, and campaign analysis. To understand 
the impact of the Helsinki Conference on Ford’s image, I researched Gallup Poll results of 
approval ratings over the course of Ford’s presidency as well as media coverage of the Helsinki 
Conference and 1976 election collected by Ford’s staff and archived in the Ford Presidential 
Library. From the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, I researched the collection entitled 
“Records on the Fall of the Berlin Wall and German Reunification.” I also researched scholarly 
works such as Daniel Thomas’s The Helsinki Effect, John Gaddis’s The Cold War, Yanek 
Mieczkowski’s Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s, and the PBS Documentary The 
Presidents: G.H.W. Bush to understand the ultimate outcomes of the Helsinki accords.  
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Chapter One: 
The Origins of President Gerald R. Ford’s Helsinki Leadership 
When he graduated from Yale Law School and opened a law practice in Grand Rapids, 
Michigan in 1941, Gerald Ford was a confirmed isolationist. As a student at Yale he had stated 
that “the U.S. should avoid entangling alliances abroad.”3 However, his subsequent World War 
II naval service in the Pacific Theater, his nearly twenty-five year career in the House of 
Representatives, and his brief tenure as vice president transformed his views on America’s 
leadership role in global affairs and enabled him to develop the key strengths that characterized 
his leadership at the Helsinki Conference. It was during this time that he formed two key foreign 
policy beliefs. First, he shifted from an isolationist to an internationalist who believed the United 
States was duty bound to play a leadership role in achieving global peace. Second, he developed 
a strong belief that this peace was best achieved through America’s military and economic 
strength. He also developed three important personal strengths that he successfully leveraged in 
combination to make his leadership successful at the Helsinki Conference. These strengths 
included courage in the face of opposition, collaboration through relationship building, and 
unquestionable integrity. This formidable combination of beliefs and strengths developed 
throughout his career enabled Ford to lead with the conviction necessary for the long term 
success of the Helsinki accords. However, Ford failed to develop the skill of inspirational 
communication that would ensure the short term success of his leadership at the Helsinki.         
Internationalism and America’s Leadership Responsibility 
Gerald Ford entered the Oval Office in 1974 intent on prioritizing a strong and visible 
foreign policy. Despite facing the daunting domestic challenges of Watergate, opposition to the 
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Vietnam War, and an ailing economy, Ford was determined to reestablish America’s leadership 
presence in the world. He had declared in his vice presidential confirmation hearings that, “I 
consider myself a moderate, certainly on domestic affairs, conservative on fiscal affairs, but a 
very dyed-in-the-wool internationalist on foreign policy.”4 And in a speech delivered at the 
University of Jacksonville in 1971 he had stated, “This is the challenge that faces us in foreign 
affairs – that we continue to assert world leadership in the face of neo-isolationism.”5 Ford’s 
iron-willed dedication to internationalist leadership was sparked during his World War II service 
and cultivated during a series of unique experiences that spanned his nearly twenty-five year 
congressional career.   
 World War II was the catalyst to Ford’s career in public service. Ford first learned of the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor while listening to the radio on his drive home from a Sunday 
afternoon in his law office on December 7, 1941. He later wrote, “There was no doubt in my 
mind that the United States would go to war, that the war would be long and that everything 
would change very quickly for me.”6 He volunteered for service in the Navy the following day 
and was sent to the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.
7
 Eager to play an active role in the 
war Ford said, “I wrote letters to everyone I knew, pleading for a billet on a ship.”8 His efforts 
were finally rewarded with an assignment aboard the U.S.S. Monterey. As a gunnery officer, 
Ford fought throughout the Pacific from New Guinea to the Gilbert Islands on successful 
offensive missions including Makin, Kwajalein, and Kaiveng where the crew of the Monterrey 
earned eleven battle stars.
9
 He survived numerous Japanese attacks as well as a typhoon that 
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nearly swept him overboard.
10
 “It was every bit as much action as I had hoped to see,” Ford 
recalled.
11
 
 This experience transformed Ford’s principles. His former isolationist stance gave way to 
an internationalist stance toward American foreign policy. Ford wrote, “My wartime experiences 
had given me an entirely new perspective. The U.S., I was convinced, could no longer stick its 
head in the sand like an ostrich.”12 In an interview with U.S. News and World Report, he 
characterized himself as a “reformed isolationist who, before World War II, was mistaken like a 
lot of people.”13 Having won the war, he believed it was imperative for the United States to build 
and maintain a strong global leadership presence that would deter future aggressors. He revealed, 
“I returned understanding we could never be isolated again. We were and are one world. It was 
clear to me, it was inevitable to me, that this country was obligated to lead in this new world”14 
The sense of duty that motivated Ford to enlist in the war effort similarly motivated him to 
maintain peace. He said, “We had won the war. It was up to us to keep the peace.”15  
It was on the strength of his internationalist conviction that Ford successfully ran for 
Congress. Within just one year of his returning from the war, Ford decided to run for the House 
of Representatives to represent Michigan’s Fifth District. “The war got me interested in the 
national and international scene in Congress,” Ford said.16 Even though West Michigan voters 
typically held quite isolationist views, Ford established internationalism as the key platform of 
the campaign. He boldly told the voters, “On foreign policy, I am an internationalist. I do not 
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believe America can live any longer in isolation.”17 And he proudly supported President 
Truman’s Marshall Plan and the creation of the United Nations.18 Ford’s opponent for the 
Republican nomination was incumbent Bartel Jonkman who remained a fervent isolationist. 
According to Ford, Jonkman “was a senior Republican on the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and was doing everything he could to torpedo constructive foreign aid legislation” and 
oppose the Marshall Plan.
19
 Ford persistently counter argued that these programs were not only 
“necessary, but morally right.”20 The voters of Grand Rapids ultimately agreed and Ford 
defeated Jonkman in the primary by a two to one margin.
21
 On November 2, 1947, Gerald Ford 
won his election to the Eighty-first Congress with a strong 60.5 percent vote.
22
  
 Once in Congress, Ford continued to develop his internationalist political position. He 
became a student of President Truman’s post-war international peace initiatives. In keeping with 
his campaign promises, he supported these initiatives with his votes. In his first year in Congress, 
Ford voted in support of President Truman’s proposal to create the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization for European security.
23
 Ford believed “America would need strong allies to resist 
the growing Communist threat.”24 When North Korea invaded South Korea, Ford publicly 
supported President Truman’s decision to deploy American military to defend South Korea.25  
Ford’s strong internationalist position defined his leadership during his first year in the 
House of Representatives. His internationalist reputation earned him speaking engagements with 
organizations such as the Bilderberg Conference, the Interparliamentary Union, and the Council 
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on Foreign Relations.
26
 And interestingly, Congressman Ford caught the attention of his future 
Secretary of State, Harvard Professor Henry A. Kissinger, who frequently invited Ford to 
Cambridge to speak with his foreign policy students. Kissinger valued Ford’s national security 
expertise and the practical approach he took to his work.
27
  
 Ford’s internationalist stance continued to develop beyond post World War II issues into 
America’s subsequent hot and cold conflicts. Ford firmly felt that Communism had become the 
new threat to global freedom. He stated in a speech at Duke University, “I personally believe that 
the Communist powers of the world implacably seek the downfall of the Free World nations – 
chiefly the United States.”28 He declared, “I want a settlement that will discourage further 
Communist aggression, whether it is in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the Pacific, or in 
Europe.”29 Therefore, Ford consistently advocated for strong military action to contain the 
Communist threat. After reviewing his voting record spanning his career in the House of 
Representatives, researchers at the Library of Congress concluded, Ford “has supported an active 
role for the United States abroad, involving close working ties with this country’s allies and 
willingness to confront serious challenges to the nation’s security.”30 For example, he called for 
the bombing of Communist China’s supply bases in 1951 during the Korean War.31 And he 
vocally criticized the withdrawal of U.S. military support from the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba 
in 1961.
32
 Ford also advocated for greater independence of East European nations from the 
Soviet Union. The Library of Congress researchers concluded that Ford consistently “supported 
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resolutions protesting the Soviet subjugation of captive nations.”33 Additionally, Ford strongly 
supported America’s radio broadcasts to encourage freedom in Eastern European nations. In 
March 1972, he reported to his Michigan constituents, “For many weeks the House and Senate 
have fought over whether to continue funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. House 
members--I among them--strongly believe that the radios should continue to operate, since this is 
the only way to get the truth through the Iron Curtain.”34 By October 1973, he proudly reported, 
“Convinced that efforts to bring the truth to the people of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc 
nations should continue, the House voted 313 to 90 last Tuesday to authorize the funding of 
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in fiscal 1974. I strongly supported this action.”35 
Ford reserved perhaps his strongest internationalist rhetoric for the Vietnam War.  Ford’s 
convictions led him to craft the 1965 statement upon which the Republican policy in Vietnam 
was based. In a fervent speech on the floor of the House of Representatives Ford outlined his 
stance for American leadership to bring the Vietnam War to a successful close to contain 
Communism. “Our purpose,” he said, “is to repel Communist aggression, to minimize American 
and Vietnamese causalities, and to bring about a swift and secure peace.”36 To accomplish that 
purpose, he called for “maximum use of American conventional air and sea power against 
significant military targets” and “a Kennedy style sea quarantine on North Vietnam.”37 He 
accused President Johnson of playing a timid leadership role in this conflict by withholding the 
full strength of the American military. Following President Johnson’s decision to deploy only 
more ground troops rather than air strikes, Ford stated, “under the policies which the president 
has just pledged to continue substantially unchanged . . . our purpose of securing a swift peace 
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has failed, because it was never tried. And our purpose of repelling Communist aggression 
remains, at best, a dubious stalemate and deadly dual of attrition.”38 Ford had put the 
internationalist leadership position he had formed during World War II into purposeful and vocal 
action recommendations during the Vietnam War.  
 A final experience that defined Congressman Ford’s internationalist leadership position 
was his visit to China. Just four months after Nixon made his historic visit that opened U.S. 
relations with China in 1972, House Minority Leader Ford and House Majority Leader Hale 
Boggs were invited to visit China to discuss cultural exchanges, trade, and international security 
issues.
39
 After extensive briefings from U.S. diplomats, Ford toured museums, a visited a Jeep 
plant, and saw a demonstration of surgery using acupuncture rather than anesthetic.
40
 But it was 
his face to face meeting with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai that indelibly shaped his 
internationalist perspective.   
 In a private meeting with Ford and Boggs, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai delivered a firm 
call for United States leadership against the Soviet Union. First, Chou En-lai blamed a lack of 
American leadership for the conflicts in Vietnam and Korea.
41
 Second, he persistently cited the 
Soviet Union’s expanding military as a global threat to peace.42 Finally, and most importantly, he 
expressed grave concern over America’s weakening military position. He stated his opposition to 
George McGovern’s plan to cut U.S. defense spending by $30 billion and asked why the U.S. 
was not strengthening NATO.
43
 Chou En-lai emphatically stated, “We don’t believe you can 
reduce your military spending” and asked, “With the Soviet Union increasing its own defenses, 
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how can you reduce yours?”44 When Majority Leader Boggs asked if Chou En-lai believed the 
Soviet Union would reduce its defense budget, Chou En-lai responded, “Never, never, never!”45 
This was a formative moment that unforgettably impacted Ford’s beliefs. His convictions that the 
world needed the United States to play an important leadership role in maintaining peace and 
protecting freedom from Communist aggression in Asia were confirmed and emboldened by his 
encounter with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai.  
Ford remained an ardent internationalist throughout his political career. During the heart 
of the Vietnam War, Congressman Ford addressed the 1968 graduating class of William and 
Mary and said, “The year I graduated from the University of Michigan was the year Adolf Hitler 
seized all power in Germany.”46 He went on to say that “My generation didn’t like the prospect 
of war any more than yours. But the nation met that challenge successfully because America’s 
moral commitment to the cause of human decency was clear. We fought that war for you – even 
though you didn’t exist yet.”47 This deeply held internationalist belief in America’s global 
leadership responsibility was initiated during Ford’s military service, honed during his post-
World War II and Vietnam congressional experiences, and cemented by the chilling statements 
of Premier Chou En-lai in China. And it became the foundation for Ford’s further belief that 
America must lead global peace from a position of military strength.  
Peace Through Strength 
Ford’s firm conviction that America was duty bound to play a leadership role in global 
peace was matched by his conviction that this global peace could be achieved through America’s 
strength. In 1970 Congressman Ford stated, the “greatest single American national interest is the 
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avoidance of a Third World War” and this can be accomplished through “the recognition by the 
world at large of the fact that the United States will use its power to deter aggression.”48 By the 
time he assumed the vice presidency, Ford continued to declare, “Strength brings peace” and 
therefore it is necessary that we maintain our military strength “so that others know America is 
strong not only in capability but in will.”49 This belief was developed through the highly 
educational and formative series of international experiences Ford sought throughout his career 
in the House of Representatives. These experiences included an active position on the 
Appropriations Defense Sub-Committee, remarkable trips throughout Southeast Asia where Ford 
experienced the Communist threat first hand, a position on the highly secretive Intelligence Sub-
Committee on Appropriations, and the aggressive role he assumed as House Minority Leader 
evaluating and attacking President Johnson’s Vietnam War policy. The often secretive nature of 
these experiences resulted in criticism that President Ford had little international experience and 
was ill-prepared for foreign policy leadership. Ford confidently responded to his critics arguing, 
“Most of the people who say that don’t know the opportunities I had in the Congress to be fully 
exposed to international matters.”50 Despite their lack of public exposure, these experiences 
provided Ford with an unusually strong education in international affairs from which he 
concluded America could maintain global peace through its strength. At Helsinki, he would 
artfully leverage America’s military and economic strength to advance peace.  
 The first experience that forged Ford’s belief in peace through strength was his position 
on the House Appropriations Committee. During Ford’s second term in Congress, he befriended 
the Chair of the Appropriations Committee, Representative John Tabor from New York. Tabor 
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appointed Ford onto the House Appropriations Committee.
51
 This appointment spanned twelve 
years during which Ford developed special expertise in the spending that underpinned America’s 
foreign policy. During that time Ford served as Chairman of the Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee and served as a member of both the Foreign Aid and Intelligence 
Subcommittees.
52
 As a member of these subcommittees Ford became an expert on the details of 
defense and foreign aid budgets. Ford routinely questioned “the secretaries of Defense, State, 
Army, Navy, Air force, and the heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” to defend their budget 
expenditures.
53
 Through these interviews and careful analysis on weapons projects that were 
brought before the committee, Ford claimed that “The eleven of us on the subcommittee knew 
more about the military and its programs than most admirals and generals.”54  
In this role Ford supported the substantial defense expenditures he believed would secure 
peace. He voted to bolster America’s military leadership with the H-bomb and the nuclear 
submarine, the Nautilus.
55
 He was one of only 11 Republican House members to vote with 120 
Democrats to against an amendment that would cap military spending to $46 billion in 1953.
56
 
Later he supported new Cold War efforts when President Truman and General Eisenhower’s 
requested sixty million dollars to support the French against Communist aggression in 
Vietnam.
57
 Congressman Ford vocally reported his emerging peace through strength stance to his 
constituents in his weekly newsletter. In 1951, he expressed his support for cutting aid that 
indirectly fuelled Communism when he proudly reported, “The Congress recently voted to 
prohibit further American aid to other nations which continued to trade with Russia and her 
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satellites. In other words, the House and Senate felt it wasn’t good sense to help a nation with 
American dollars or materials if that nation continued to trade with the enemy.”58 Similarly, he 
reported General Eisenhower’s position that “we cannot afford to let the 200 million people of 
Europe . . . be dominated by Red Russia” and by providing military support “the threat of a 
Communist attack on Europe and America would be stalled or stopped.”59 The Congressional 
Quarterly declared, “As a House member, Ford had built a solid reputation as a believer in a 
strong military and as a consistent opponent of defense cutbacks.”60  
  Armed with the detailed knowledge of the defense and foreign aid budgets, Ford travelled 
overseas to personally evaluate the impact of America’s foreign policy spending. While Ford’s 
belief in peace through strength was sparked by his arduous budget work on the Defense Sub-
Committee, it fully ignited during his international travels. In 1953, Ford traveled to South East 
Asia with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.
61
 In Korea Ford toured the front lines, witnessed 
the return of American prisoners of war and visited a South Korean training facility.
62
 From that 
experience, Ford concluded that South Korea would have the “finest army in the world” but 
would be unsuccessful without “money to fight with or without aid.”63 After Korea, Ford 
traveled to Saigon to inspect French troops and supply operations from the aid package he had 
supported. He personally interviewed military commanders and soldiers. From that experience 
Ford concluded that, “The French had neither a plan for popular government in Vietnam nor any 
practical strategy for winning a war against the Communists.”64 Ford then traveled to Taiwan to 
meet with General Chaing Kai-Shek where he concluded that the Chinese Nationalists were too 
                                                          
58
 Ford, Washington Review: A Report from Your Congressman, 21 June 1951. 
59
 Ford, Washington Review: A Report from Your Congressman, 8 February 1951. 
60
 “Gerald Ford: The Man and his Record,” Congressional Quarterly, 8. 
61
 DeFrank, Write it When I’m Gone, 184. 
62
 Cannon, Time and Chance, 63. 
63
 Qtd., Ibid., 63. 
64
 Qtd., Ibid., 63. 
20 
 
weak to retake the mainland.
65
 In light of the collective weaknesses Ford witnessed, he became 
convinced that the United States must use its military strength to assist the democratic 
governments and prevent Communist encroachment in South East Asia.  
 Ford’s belief in peace through strength was further galvanized when he was appointed to 
the Intelligence Subcommittee of Appropriations in 1956. In his position on the committee Ford 
listened to hearings on the top secret CIA budget where he said, “No transcripts were made, 
None.”66 Despite the fact that he was a Republican, he was appointed to the committee because 
the Democrats in power trusted him based on the bi-partisan defense decisions he made in his 
Appropriations Committee work. During Ford’s tenure on the Intelligence Subcommittee, 
America’s covert Cold War initiatives escalated substantially. The CIA sent military support to 
the Hungarian Revolution and deposed Communist leaning leaders in the Congo, Algeria, 
Turkey, and Guatemala.
67
 It invested in the creation of sophisticated satellite spy equipment, 
missiles, and bombers.
68
 Ford found himself in a position of tremendous influence on this 
committee when the Cold War accelerated. As his influence increased, so did his belief in peace 
through America’s overt and covert military strength. 
Although he was bound to secrecy in his work overseeing the CIA budget, he boldly 
publicized his advocacy of peace through strength through his hawkish stance on the Vietnam 
War. In a speech addressing the National Press Club on July 21, 1965, Ford outlined his fully 
developed belief in peace through strength. He started by declaring that if America was to 
succeed in the hot war in Vietnam, it must “face up to the true nature of the enemy – 
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Communism.”69 Ford declared that “we are advised by so-called experts that the Soviet Union 
wants peaceful coexistence” and that “we should encourage such change by a more tolerant 
attitude toward Communism.”70 Then he warned, “This has been a theme based on hope, not 
evidence.”71 The reality, he said, is that “In Eastern Europe tens of millions of people live under 
Communist repression” where “the principle of national self-determination is ruthlessly 
denied.”72 He cited “the reality of the Cuban missile crisis” where “Communist deceit and 
aggression were made plain for all to see.”73 Having established this historical blind spot, he 
declared “Our lesson in Cuba ought to guide us [in] Vietnam.74 He insisted that “Our power is 
known to the enemy. The enemy must be convinced of the fact that we will use that power to 
meet the threat of aggression” in Vietnam.75 He concluded that “We will win our peace by 
resistance to evil. We will not buy it by compromise with evil.”76  
 Ford’s peace through strength belief was grounded in the intimate knowledge of the 
defense and foreign aid budgets developed through his arduous work on the Appropriations 
Defense Subcommittee, reinforced when he witnessed the impact of those decisions in his trips 
to South East Asia and Eastern Europe, solidified in his work on the Intelligence Subcommittee 
on Appropriations, and vocalized in his hawkish stance on the Vietnam War. As he approached 
the end of his congressional career, Ford argued that the United States had achieved success in 
foreign affairs because it never ceased showing the world that the United States would do 
whatever necessary to demonstrate its commitment to its responsibilities.
77
 With peace through 
                                                          
69
 Qtd., Doyle, Gerald R. Ford Selected Speeches, 196. 
70
 Qtd., Ibid., 196. 
71
 Qtd., Ibid., 196. 
72
 Qtd., Ibid., 197. 
73
 Qtd., Ibid., 198. 
74
 Qtd., Ibid., 199. 
75
 Qtd., Ibid., 199. 
76
 Qtd., Ibid., 203. 
77
 Ibid., 179. 
22 
 
strength Ford said, “What we are telling the Soviet Union and the world is that we will not allow 
the other super-power to gain any advantages and we will continue to lead the world toward 
peace.”78  
Courage in the Face of Opposition 
Beyond his important foundational beliefs in America’s internationalist leadership 
responsibility and peace through strength, Ford developed three important strengths during his 
congressional and vice presidential experiences that defined his leadership at the Helsinki 
Conference. The first of these was courage in the face of opposition. The moment he entered 
Congress, he decided he would be an independent decision maker. In fact, on his first 
congressional bill, he intentionally voted against Republican House Leader Joe Martin and Whip 
Charles Halleck who were advancing a bill to reduce the power of the House Rules Committee.
79
 
Throughout his congressional career, Ford continued to develop his ability to navigate difficult 
opposition. 
 Ford’s first major demonstration of courage in the face of opposition came during his 
appointment to the House Appropriations Committee. According to Ford, “Representative Albert 
Engel decided to leave the Congress to run for governor of Michigan” in 1950.80 Ford was then 
serving on the Public Works Committee and asked his friend John Taber for the appointment to 
Engel’s position on the Appropriations Committee. Taber replied, “Jerry, if the Michigan 
delegation will vote for you, I want you on the committee.”81 However, Ford was embroiled in a 
debate with his Michigan peers as he opposed a public works project that they wanted.
82
 Ford 
discussed the dilemma with his wife Betty who reminded him, “You’ve always said you’ve got 
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to vote for what you think is right, and if that means you have to sacrifice getting on the 
Appropriations Committee, that’s too bad.83 “Ford boldly maintained his opposition to the public 
works project, but convinced the Michigan Republicans to support his appointment. In the face 
of this opposition, Ford stood his ground and was given his seat on the Appropriations 
Committee. In recognition of his courageous leadership in his first years in Congress, the U.S. 
Junior Chamber of Commerce named him one of the ten outstanding young men of the year for 
his “vigorous and hard-hitting reform movement against well-entrenched county and state 
political machines.”84  
Ford took an even more courageous stance to win the role of House Minority Leader. The 
landslide defeat of Barry Goldwater by Lyndon Johnson in the presidential election, combined 
with the loss of thirty-eight seats in the House prompted Ford and a group of Republican 
representatives called the Young Turks to overthrow Republican Leadership in the House.
85
 This 
group selected Ford as their challenger and in December, 1964, he announced his intention to 
challenge thirty year House veteran, Charles Halleck, for his Minority Leader position.
86
 Ford 
was concerned with Halleck’s approach of simply saying ‘no’ to Democratic proposals and 
declared his approach “an abdication of responsibility.”87 He therefore feistily claimed he was 
running to lead a “fighting, forward-looking party seeking responsible and constructive solutions 
to national problems.”88 After an “open fight,” Ford won the challenge in a close 73 to 67 secret 
ballot vote.
89
 For the next nine years, Ford would use his position as House Minority Leader as a 
courageous opponent of President Johnson and his handling of the Vietnam War. 
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Given his ardent internationalist belief in America’s global leadership role, coupled with 
his belief in peace through strength, Ford strongly opposed what he believed was President 
Johnson’s doomed strategy for the Vietnam War. Ford believed the United States should utilize 
its military strength to win the war. Shortly after becoming Minority Leader, Ford met with 
Johnson and courageously told him, “We went into Vietnam to win, and militarily we must do 
what we have to do to win.”90 In another meeting, Ford told President Johnson to “use our full 
non-nuclear capability to bomb Hanoi.”91 Ford further informed Johnson that the United States 
was signaling a lack of commitment to our opponents saying, “I think the presence of U.S. 
dependents indicates to the enemy that we don’t take this conflict seriously. I strongly urge you 
to take the dependents out. I believe you should move forward with a military plan and win the 
war.”92 Ford also aired his criticisms publicly on national television in his weekly show with 
Senate Minority Leader, Everett Dirksen.
93
  
Ford’s direct and candid criticism of the Vietnam War policy infuriated President 
Johnson. Johnson responded by calling Ford “dumb” and famously joking that “Jerry played 
football too many times without a helmet.”94 Then in a cruel act of vengeance, Johnson falsely 
told press reporters that Ford had leaked a fabricated report regarding Johnson’s refusal to send 
military reserves into Vietnam and stated that “the Leader’s carelessness was endangering the 
lives of our troops in Vietnam.”95 This false accusation was refuted by Newsweek reporter Sam 
Shaffer who had attended Ford’s press conference and published a letter defending Ford by 
                                                          
90
 Qtd., Cannon, Time and Chance, 87. 
91
 Qtd., Ibid., 88. 
92
 Qtd., Ibid., 87-88. 
93
 Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford, 5-6. 
94
 Qtd., Ibid., 5-6. 
95
 Qtd., Cannon, Time and Chance, 87. 
25 
 
saying the subject of Vietnam was not discussed.
96
 Despite wide-spread encouragement from his 
friends to take revenge, Ford did not retaliate.  
Even in the face of Johnson’s vengeful personal attacks, Ford continued to criticize the 
president’s Vietnam War strategy and encourage a more aggressive military plan to win the 
conflict.  In his memorable 1967 address to the House of Representatives, he boldly challenged 
Johnson’s leadership and stated, “I do not believe the grave challenges we face at home can be 
countered simply by pouring out more and more money, neither do I believe the grave challenge 
in Southeast Asia can be met merely by pouring in more and more blood.”97 He implored, “Mr. 
Speaker, we must ask another question: Why are we pulling our best punches in Vietnam? Is 
there no end, no other answer than more men, more men, more men?”98 In place of this doomed 
approach, Ford advocated for “using America’s awesome arsenal of conventional arms to 
compel a swift and sure peace” and to apply “concerted military pressure that could force the 
enemy to the negotiating table.”99  
Ford’s record of courage in the face of opposition was recognized with the John F. 
Kennedy Profile in Courage Award in 2001. Upon receiving this honor, Ford said “The greatest 
defeat of all would be to live without courage, for that would hardly be living at all.”100 This type 
of victorious courage began in Ford’s first congressional vote, continued in his appointment to 
the House Appropriations Committee and his challenge for House Minority Leader, and 
culminated in his vocal and persistent challenge for a new strategy to win the Vietnam War. 
Ford’s courage was perhaps possible because he was, at the same time, a collaborative 
relationship builder. 
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Collaboration through Relationship Building  
 Ford was a remarkable relationship builder and collaborator. Reflecting on the many 
roles he held across his career, he noted, “I have always been able to develop allegiances with 
good people, I don’t know how to define it, or why I have it, but I have a capability of getting 
people to like to work with me.”101 While his naturally affable personality played an important 
role in this leadership strength, Ford worked hard to develop this skill as he worked with his 
constituents back in Michigan’s Fifth District, his bi-partisan work on the Intelligence sub-
committee of the House Appropriations Committee, and his congressional partners as House 
Minority Leader under both Democratic and Republican presidential administrations. Given he 
led from a Republican minority position in the House of Representative through most of his 
career, collaborative relationship building was essential for success. As he entered Congress in 
1948 Ford said he quickly learned that, “You had to make allegiances to get something done.”102  
Perhaps the most important collaborative relationships were with his constituents. 
Despite intense travel and committee obligations, Ford prioritized frequent two–way 
communication with the people from Michigan’s Fifth District. Throughout his congressional 
career, he traveled to Michigan every couple of weeks to connect in person. He read and 
answered their letters, he listened to their ideas and concerns, and he communicated to them with 
regular press releases documenting his work. In his March 1951 newsletter, the Washington 
Review, he informed his constituents that he received 1,500 letters in the month of January and 
he assured them that “all get my personal attention.”103 And in his March 15, 1951 newsletter he 
informed his constituents that 50 percent of the letters he receives “demand the president and 
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Congress slash federal spending” and said “I would like your reaction to this vital problem.”104 
The newsletter provided a questionnaire for constituents to indicate in which areas they favored 
spending cuts and invited them to send their responses to his office in Washington.
105
 Ford 
believed that “you can gain a lot from reading and thinking, but you’re more likely to acquire a 
sense of the mood of the country by meeting with people.”106  
Congressman Ford worked hard to foster these relationships even when his constituents 
disagreed with his opinions. For example, he publicly supported the nomination of General 
Eisenhower rather than Republican establishment candidate Senator Robert Taft in 1951. This 
concerned many of Ford’s Republican constituents and he received numerous letters along with 
threats to run a more conservative candidate against Ford in the next election.
107
 But Ford 
invested the time necessary to build relationships with these concerned constituents and shared 
the rationale for his stand. He recalled, “I knew I had to listen, and it took a lot of explaining to 
people back in the district.”108 This investment paid off over the course of his career. In fact, “his 
empathy with constituents, and their belief in his integrity, had made Jerry Ford the best known 
citizen of Western Michigan.”109 The relationships he built with his constituents were rewarded 
with thirteen election victories over twenty-five years and as Ford recalled, “every time I ran for 
reelection, the percentage of my winning margin was larger than my first race.”110  
 Ford was equally dedicated to collaborative relationship building with his congressional 
partners of both parties. In his early years in Congress, he built a reputation for working 
effectively across partisan boundaries. Ford learned that even political adversaries could find 
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common ground on which to collaborate. He once explained his collaborative philosophy by 
drawing overlapping circles and saying, “If these circles intersect each other, then work with 
them on that one, and you can get something done in there.”111 Alabama Democrat Carl Elliott 
joined the House of Representatives in 1949 and characterized Ford as being “a likable fellow” 
who would ask his colleagues questions until he understood their issues and “was impressed by 
his diligence and inquiring mind.”112 Michigan Republican Senator Robert P. Griffin who served 
with Ford in the 1960s said Ford, had the “ability to get along with people” and “he always got 
along well with people of both political parties.”113  
This early bi-partisan collaboration was especially evident in Ford’s work on the Defense 
Appropriations Committee. West Texas Democrat George Mahon was Ford’s leader on this 
committee and complimented his collaborative bi-partisan approach saying, “Regardless of the 
administration in power, he works toward the accomplishment of the attainable. He is a man you 
can work with.”114 Ford further developed his collaboration through relationship skills when he 
became House Minority Leader. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen and former House 
Minority Leader Charles Halleck were close colleagues. Ford wanted to build a close 
relationship with Dirksen but was concerned with how Dirksen would treat him having 
challenged Halleck for the role. To build an effective relationship, Ford said, “I decided I would 
defer to him, seek his help, ask his advice, ask for his help.”115 This approach forged a strong 
partnership and the two collaborated to advance Republican alternatives to President Johnson’s 
Great Society policies. Ford believed the problems of poverty and racial discrimination were 
important. However, he did not believe they could be solved along with the Vietnam War. Ford 
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said, “I didn’t believe that the nation could afford both guns and butter.”116 To identify solutions, 
Minority Leader Ford created a committee to identify more efficient and affordable alternatives 
to Johnson’s Great Society legislation.117 Ford said that “in almost every case, we came up with 
better, less costly, more practical ideas than the administration proposed.”118 For example, this 
team generated proposals for incentives to engage the private sector in the war on poverty, 
economic growth plans through federal revenue sharing, and the expansion of voting rights 
protection to all states.
119
  
Ford first had to unify his fellow Republicans behind these proposals. Conservative 
Republicans wanted stronger opposition to Johnson’s proposals; more liberal Republicans 
wanted to accept Johnson’s budget increases.120 By modeling and encouraging compromise, he 
successfully navigated opposition from the Republican conservative and liberal extremes to 
generate unity.
121
 Ford’s law partner and friend Philip Buchen noted as Minority Leader, Ford 
“had to keep a rather disparate set of Republicans together” and to develop positions that the 
minority party was able to support together, Ford “had to accommodate conflicting interests and 
he had to compromise.”122 Then in House debates with Democrats on these issues, Ford “could 
be vigorously partisan.”123 However, he conscientiously sought good working relationships and 
“at the end he would make a point of shaking hands and enjoying a laugh with his Democratic 
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adversary.”124 Ford described his conciliatory approach saying, “You have to give a little to get 
what you really want, but you don’t have to give up your principles.”125  
 Ford continued to build his collaboration through relationship building competence as 
Minority Leader when Republican Richard Nixon was elected president in 1968. As Minority 
Leader during the Johnson administration, Ford’s role had been to generate and promote 
Republican alternatives to Johnson’s programs. Now he said, “My job was to push Nixon’s 
programs through the House.”126 Since Nixon did not cultivate a strong relationship with 
Congress and instead chose to focus on foreign policy, the difficult work of generating 
congressional support to the president’s proposals fell to Ford.  
Nixon’s Federal Revenue Sharing proposal proved to be Minority Leader Ford’s greatest 
success in collaborative relationship building during the Nixon administration. Federal Revenue 
sharing had been proposed several times during the 1960s. However, most members of Congress 
wanted to remain in control of Federal funds and opposed sending it to local governments.
127
 For 
a year and a half, Ford built a broad and strong coalition of Republican and Democratic House 
members as well as local governors, mayors and county employees to support the president’s 
plan.
128
 In his newsletter to his Michigan constituents, Ford proudly wrote, the House is 
“scheduled to take up Wednesday a bill providing $30 billion over five years for Sharing of 
Federal revenue with States and local units of government. Funds to be shared the first year total 
5.3 billion. I strongly support this bill.”129 In June 1972, this coalition succeeded in passing the 
Federal Revenue Sharing legislation in the House of Representatives.
130
 In fact, during his time 
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as Minority Leader between 1965 and 1974, Ford’s effective collaboration resulted in his 
delivering 85 per cent to 95 per cent of the Republican vote.”131  
When Ford became president, Republican Representative Melvin Laird reflected that 
President “Ford was more willing to compromise with Congress than any recent president” 
because he was used to operating in the minority and “he had perfected the art of compromise 
during his congressional career.”132 Despite the magnitude of the challenges he faced as 
president and as a congressman, Ford “was respected and beloved by colleagues in the 
Congress.”133 The respect he garnered for his willingness to forge collaborative relationships was 
matched only by his unquestionable integrity. 
Unquestionable Integrity  
Ford believed that integrity was a leader’s foundation. In a speech delivered at the 
University of Michigan in 1967 he articulated his belief that, “The American people are 
constantly engaged in a search for truth – for political truth, for moral truth, truth in government, 
for verities in our international relations.”134 He aspired to deliver that truth throughout his 
career. So when at his first presidential press conference Ford was asked if he would establish a 
set of ethical guidelines to prevent another Watergate scandal, he could confidently respond, 
“The code of ethics will be the example I set.”135 Ford’s Chief of Staff, Richard Cheney 
confirmed that Ford carried through on this definitive declaration stating, “by virtue of who he 
was, the way he carried himself and the way he operated, he was able to restore the integrity of 
the presidency.”136 Ford had built his reputation for integrity in his interaction with his 
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congressional colleagues, the public, and the press over the course of his congressional career. 
But the full extent of his integrity was revealed during his vice presidential confirmation hearings 
and his handling of the Watergate scandal as vice president. And this career long commitment to 
integrity would authentically fuel the integrity that he demanded and endorsed at the Helsinki 
Conference. 
 First, Ford demonstrated his unquestionable integrity with his congressional colleagues. 
In his early work on the Appropriations Committee, he earned a reputation as a leader who kept 
his word.
137
 According to Ford’s Press Secretary, “Mr. Ford was well respected as a man whose 
word was his bond” among the members of Congress with whom he had worked on the 
Intelligence Committee and the Appropriations Committee.
138
 It was his integrity that motivated 
his Republican counterparts to support his challenge for House Minority Leader. As Michigan 
Senator Robert Griffin recalled, “I felt Ford had a better chance of winning” because “Jerry Ford 
didn’t seem to have any enemies. Everybody liked him; he was a good guy.”139 As a visual 
expression of his integrity, Ford refused to put his wife on the congressional payroll as 
compensation for her work with constituents. Despite the fact that other congressmen were doing 
so, Ford agreed with his staff assistant’s assessment that, “it’s contrary to your whole philosophy 
of public service.”140  
 Second, Ford illustrated his unquestionable integrity in his interactions with the public. 
His newsletters to constituents frequently delivered candid, honest appraisals of the issues he 
faced in Washington. For example, after Congress had passed a law forbidding foreign aid to 
nations who traded with Russia, Ford candidly proclaimed in his June 1951 newsletter that 
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President Truman had “clearly circumvented the will of the Congress and the American people” 
when he granted aid to such nations.
141
 However, it was his vocal stance rebuking President 
Johnson’s Vietnam mistruths that most vividly demonstrated his integrity with the public. In his 
“Why are We Pulling our Best Punches in Vietnam?” speech, Ford declared, “I believe it is high 
time the American people knew the truth.”142 He went on to say, “Would the American people 
believe that despite the much-publicized and prayerful presidential decision to allow bombing of 
some oil depots a year ago, about three-fourths of the enemy’s petroleum storage targets had not 
yet come under attack?”143 He further questioned, “Would the American people believe that in 
mid-1967, after two and one-half years of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam – an area about the 
size of Michigan – only 3 out of every 10 significant military targets had ever been struck by 
U.S. air power?”144 Ford drove this home saying, “It is high time the American people knew 
what the real issue was. The real issue, Mr. Speaker, was whether we really have any hope of 
winning the Vietnam War.”145 He concluded by declaring, “What is especially dishonest is 
secretly to forbid effective strategic action and publicly portray it as an honest try.”146 Rather 
than personally attacking Johnson, or pandering to public opposition to the war, Ford revealed 
the president’s mistruths about the Vietnam War.   
 Even President Johnson respected Ford’s integrity. In the last days of his presidency, 
Johnson invited Ford to the Oval Office for a private meeting. The president said to Ford, “Jerry, 
you and I have had a lot of head-to-head confrontations. I’ve been pretty rough on you, and 
you’ve been a little rough on me at times. But I never doubted your integrity.”147  
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The extent of Ford’s unquestionable integrity was fully revealed to the American public 
during Ford’s vice presidential confirmation hearings. Following Vice President Spiro Agnew’s 
resignation, President Nixon considered nominating Ford for the position. Nixon advisor Patrick 
Buchanen argued for Ford saying, “He has the capacity and integrity to be a good president 
should something happen.”148 Nixon concurred and on October 10, 1973 under the twenty-fifth 
amendment, nominated Ford for vice president subject to approval by Congress.
149
 Congress and 
the FBI subsequently conducted “the most thorough searches into the background of a nominee 
in the history of American politics.”150 The FBI unleashed 350 agents to scrutinize Ford’s 
background.
151
 Ford cooperated fully with the investigation and authorized complete access to 
his personal history. He instructed his “lawyer, his accountant, his banker, his doctor, his peers in 
the House, his personal friends, and his brothers, to put everything on the record.”152 Ford hoped 
that this transparency would “result in a greater sense of public confidence in government.”153 
The FBI then interviewed over a thousand people and produced a 1,700 page report on Ford.
154
 
No improprieties or misconduct of any kind were revealed in the investigation. 
 Ford further underscored his commitment to unquestionable integrity during his 
confirmation hearings before Congress. In his opening remarks Ford stated his belief that “Truth 
is the glue on the bond that holds government together, and not only government, but civilization 
itself.”155 He went on to say, “Through my testimony it is my intention to replace 
misunderstanding with understanding, and to substitute truth for untruth.”156 When asked during 
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the proceedings what personal characteristics were important to presidential leadership, Ford said 
“I think the president has to be a person of great truth and the American people have to believe 
that he is truthful.”157 Congress believed in Ford’s integrity and confirmed his nomination with 
overwhelming margins of 387-35 in the House and 92-3 in the Senate.
158
  
 Vice President Ford’s unquestionable integrity was critically tested as the full extent of 
the Watergate scandal unfolded in 1974. Nixon had reassured Ford that he was not involved in 
the Watergate break in and Ford believed him. Ford said, “You have to believe the president and 
I did believe him.”159 Given the value he placed on integrity, he therefore urged the president to 
fully disclose the facts. In a speech in St. Johns, Michigan, Ford said, “The way to clear up 
Watergate is for John Mitchell, John Dean, and any others who have publicly said they are not 
involved in, and had no information on Watergate, [to] go before the Senate Committee, take an 
oath, and deny it publicly.”160  
However, when President Nixon finally confessed his involvement in Watergate at a 
cabinet meeting, Ford immediately distanced himself to protect his integrity. Ford issued what 
became known as his “declaration of independence” in August 1974.161 Ford stated to the 
cabinet, “I came to a decision yesterday and you may be aware that I informed the press that 
because of commitments to Congress and the public, I’ll have no further comment on the issue 
because I am a party of interest.”162 And when Nixon’s Chief of Staff, Alexander Haig, privately 
offered Vice President Ford several options, including an option for Ford to assume the 
presidency upon Nixon’s potential resignation in exchange for a pardon, Ford declined. With two 
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witnesses, Ford read a statement to Haig over the phone that said, “I want you to understand that 
I have no intention of recommending what the president should do about resigning or not 
resigning.”163 Ford’s integrity had stood up to the ultimate temptation of a sure path to becoming 
president of the United States.   
 Colleagues who knew Ford best agreed that Ford made no deal exchanging the 
presidency for a Nixon pardon. Michigan Senator Robert P. Griffin said “I am convinced that 
Ford did not agree to the pardon in advance.”164 He argued that “Ford later went before 
Committee of Congress and stated under oath that no deal was involved.”165 Similarly, Ford’s 
press secretary Jerald TerHorst said, “I do not think there was any private deal made with 
Richard Nixon that if he resigned, he would be given a pardon in thirty days. Jerry Ford is just 
not that kind of guy.”166  
As with his commitment to unquestionable integrity with his colleagues and his 
constituents, Ford demonstrated his unquestionable integrity with the press during his 
congressional career through the height of the Watergate scandal. Newsweek reporter Tom 
DeFrank covered Ford during his Vice Presidency and remarked, “He was the most remarkably 
guileless political figure I’ve ever known.”167 DeFrank traveled with Ford who took thirty-five 
trips to forty-one states and said that Ford “had an old-fashioned sense of public accountability” 
and “scheduled at least one press conference on every trip” despite the fact that he was “routinely 
hammered about his support for Nixon, Watergate, the tapes, impeachment, and the like.”168 Ron 
Nessen, Ford’s Press Secretary from 1974 to 1977, said that unlike Nixon, Ford “didn’t have a 
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list of enemy reporters. I think he was open and honest, and civil in his dealing with 
reporters.”169 Given Ford’s strong commitment to integrity, he believed that meeting with the 
press was a critical obligation for an elected leader.
170
 Ford’s steadfast and unshakable integrity 
became the hall mark of his leadership recognized by his constituents, his congressional peers in 
both parties, and the press. 
Inspirational Communication Weakness  
 However, the remarkable integrity of Ford’s communication with constituents, peers and 
the press did not necessarily translate into inspiration in communicating with them. As he 
reflected on his career in public service, Ford said that if he were to return to college, “knowing 
what I know today – I’d concentrate on two areas: learning to write and to speak before an 
audience. Nothing in life is more important than the ability to communicate effectively.”171 In his 
vice presidential acceptance speech Ford admitted, “I am a Ford, not a Lincoln. My addresses 
will never be as eloquent as Mr. Lincoln’s. But I will do my very best to equal his brevity and 
plain speaking.”172 Having resigned himself to being plain speaking, he never mastered the 
ability to craft an engaging message to communicate a compelling vision and deliver it with the 
enthusiasm that could have inspired and motivated the American people to embrace his 
positions. He appeared robotic and awkward on television and even loyal supporters like Tom 
DeFrank unabashedly stated, “With rare exceptions, Ford was a dreadful orator.”173 The failure 
to develop this skill would prevent Ford from articulating a compelling reason for the American 
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people and Congress to embrace the Helsinki accords and his controversial decision to attend the 
conference. 
 There were several reasons why Ford failed to develop this skill. First, the path he chose 
as he began his congressional career did not require compelling communication for his success. 
When he joined Congress, senior Michigan Representative Earl Michener told Ford, “You can 
become one of two kinds of Members of the House. You can either be a floor man and learn how 
to handle debate . . . or you can become a committee expert.”174 Ford ultimately chose to become 
a committee expert. Work on the various Appropriations Subcommittees on which he served 
during his first ten years in Congress required the skills of relationship building, collaboration, 
and detailed analysis. The work did not require superior oratorical skills to be effective. This 
work did not demand that he envision and articulate new ideas, nor did it require that he 
publically defend his committees’ decisions. Ford said of this type of work, “My idea of vision is 
ensuring that we are making progress on a day-to-day basis. I want to know the accounting 
figures for how we did today and how we’re going to do tomorrow – and how we’re going to get 
there in practical terms.”175 He dismissed vision as “just a fancy word people use to justify 
spending a lot of money.”176 In 1961 after years of arduous and unpublicized committee work, 
Ford was rewarded for his approach with an award from the Political Science Association who 
described him glowingly saying, “He symbolizes the hard-working, competent legislator who 
eschews the more colorful, publicity seeking roles in favor of a solid record of achievement in 
the real work of the House: Committee work.”177 With recognition like this for his committee 
work, Ford saw little reason to develop his communication skills. 
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 The second reason Ford didn’t develop strong communication skills that he lacked 
natural talent in this area and willingly allowed himself to be upstaged by partners who 
possessed it. When he became House Minority Leader, he partnered with Senate Minority 
Leader Everett Dirksen in press conferences to articulate Republican legislative ideas. According 
to Ford, Senator Dirksen’s “command of the language was extraordinary and his manner of 
speaking unique. He’d obfuscate with such flair and weave tales with such gusto that reporters 
soon forgot the questions they have asked.”178 In contrast, Ford bypassed flashy oratory for 
“facts and figures that some audiences considered boring.”179 Robert T. Hartmann was Minority 
Leader Ford’s press counselor and recalled, “I found Ford was not inarticulate. He was very 
intelligent, but almost tone-deaf to a felicitous combination of words. And he did not see that 
words were for the purpose of making things happen.”180 Where Ford’s television performances 
appeared “plain and businesslike,” Dirksen’s were inspiring, amusing, and witty.181 Ford recalled 
that his staff voiced concern that Dirksen was “getting all the headlines” and in the process 
“squeezing you out.”182 But he was content with the partnership and did not see the need to 
develop the communication skills that could compete with the effervescent and memorable 
Dirksen on television.  
 In addition to these missed opportunities to develop strong communication skills, Ford’s 
image was further challenged by President Johnson’s characterization of him as unintelligent. As 
Ford’s criticism of Johnson’s Great Society and Vietnam War policies escalated, Johnson fought 
back with publically damaging rhetoric. Speech writer Robert Orben recalled that Johnson made 
frequent comments such as Ford was so dumb that he “couldn’t chew gum and walk at the same 
                                                          
178
 Ford, A Time to Heal, 82. 
179
 Qtd., Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s, 10. 
180
 Qtd., Cannon, Time and Chance, 92. 
181
 Qtd., Ibid., 90. 
182
 Ford, A Time to Heal, 82. 
40 
 
time.”183 Without the strong public communication skills to defend himself, this image of Ford 
stuck.    
 However, perhaps the single strongest reason that Ford did not develop effective 
communication skills is that he simply didn’t need them to win elections. The campaign trail 
could have provided the single best opportunity to hone such skills. Yet he attained solid election 
victories to thirteen terms in the House of Representatives from Michigan’s Fifth District voters 
running without this skill. He fervently believed that the people of Michigan would elect him on 
his strong record of performance and his unquestionable integrity, rather than flowery oratory. 
Because of his long term success, the campaign advice he consistently gave to his Republican 
colleagues was simply, “Build a good record. Campaign on that record.”184 Ironically, in the 
nation’s historic first application of the twenty-fifth amendment to the United States 
Constitution, Ford became America’s first vice president and then president without delivering a 
single campaign speech.  
On August 9, 1974 Gerald R. Ford was sworn in as the thirty-eighth president of the 
United States. He entered the office with the fervently held internationalist belief that America 
was responsible for leading solutions toward global peace and that this peace could best be 
attained by maintaining America’s military strength. He was armed with the effective leadership 
skills of courage in the face of opposition, collaborative compromise through relationship 
building, and unquestionable integrity that he had honed throughout his congressional career. 
What he lacked was the ability to effectively and inspirationally communicate his ideas. In plain 
words and without the brilliant oratory skills of many of his predecessors, he made an important 
pledge to the world in his Swearing in Address. He said, “to the peoples and governments of all 
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friendly nations – and I hope that could encompass the whole world – I pledge an uninterrupted 
and sincere search for peace.”185 With this pledge and with these beliefs and strengths, he took 
office and began his work developing the foreign policy that would embrace and elevate the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and sign the Helsinki accords. 
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Chapter Two: 
President Ford’s Leadership at the Helsinki Conference 
 
The Helsinki accords signed by President Ford in 1975 at the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe had their roots in a Soviet proposal more than two decades earlier. In 
1954, the Soviets proposed a conference between the Eastern and Western nations of Europe that 
would ratify the political boundaries that followed World War II. The Western nations were 
skeptical of Soviet motives and resisted the idea. However, as the nature of the Cold War 
evolved from hostile confrontation to détente, and human rights were added to the negotiations, 
the two sides agreed to such a conference. Negotiations for the Helsinki Final Act began during 
the Nixon administration and concluded under the Ford administration. President Nixon’s Soviet 
foreign policy of détente was characterized by appeasement and therefore resulted in a quiet, 
backseat role for the United States in the negotiations.  
President Ford’s Soviet foreign policy of détente demanded a more prominent leadership 
role in the Helsinki Conference. Driven by his joint beliefs in internationalism and peace through 
strength, and rooted in his integrity, President Ford supported the successful conclusion of the 
negotiations to include human rights and self-determination in the Final Act. He resolutely 
decided to attend the Helsinki Conference in person, despite the fact that he faced significant 
domestic headwinds from an oppositional public, the media, and Congress. Leveraging his 
strength of collaboration through relationship building, he conducted extensive personal 
diplomacy with leaders from Eastern bloc nations, Western NATO allies, and the Soviet Union. 
He delivered a compelling speech designed to encourage these leaders to keep the promises of 
human rights, self-determination, and equality articulated in the Helsinki accords.   
43 
 
Prelude to Helsinki: Cold War Foreign Policy under Nixon and Ford  
Throughout most of Ford’s career in Congress, the Cold War between the United States 
and the Soviet Union was marked by hostile confrontation. The Soviet Union sought to advance 
its ideology of struggle toward a classless society and a command economic system ruled by 
authoritarian government. The United States sought to advance its ideology of individual 
freedom and a capitalist economic system ruled by democratic government. Each side built 
elaborate military and covert intelligence systems. Overt conflicts emerged in areas such as 
Korea and Vietnam as each superpower fought to promote its own ideology and contain its 
opponent’s ideology. Hostilities peaked during the Cuban missile crisis where the superpowers 
contemplated unleashing their nuclear weapons and threatening the safety of the entire world.      
In the final years of Ford’s congressional career, the nature of the Cold War underwent a 
dramatic shift where hostility gave way to the more conciliatory policy of détente. Détente 
emerged as the logical Cold War policy between the United States and the Soviet Union for 
several reasons. First, the Soviet Union had reached nuclear weapon parity with the United 
States. Secretary of State Kissinger admitted, “In the late 1960’s it became apparent that the 
Soviet Union, for practical purposes, had achieved a kind of rough parity with the United 
States.”186 The oil price increases that followed the Arab embargo benefited the Soviet Union 
who subsequently plowed its profits into military spending during a time when the United States 
dramatically cut its defense budget.
187
 Second, the global economic stagnation that soon 
followed made extraordinary military spending burdensome and potential economic trade 
attractive for both superpowers. According to Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly 
Dobrynin, “The Soviet economy was stagnant” and therefore “the party establishment gradually 
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began to realize the need to satisfy the population’s basic requirements more fully and to narrow 
the gap with the West in technology and the economy itself.”188 Similarly, the United States 
welcomed trade opportunities with the Soviet Union and China to stem its own contracting 
economy.
189
 Third, each superpower was finding it difficult to control its increasingly 
independent allies. Since World War II, NATO allies enjoyed the security of its close ties with 
America. However, Dobrynin observed that by 1970 the “major Western powers, led by West 
Germany and France, increasingly sought to pursue a more independent policy and improve their 
relations with Moscow.”190 Nations such as Turkey and Greece “had become willing to defy the 
United States.”191 Similarly, the Soviets were experiencing cracks in its own alliance. The Soviet 
invasion to crush the rebellion in Czechoslovakia resulted in protests in Warsaw Pact countries 
such Romania and Yugoslavia.
192
 For these reasons, the United States and the Soviet Union 
agreed that more normalized relations were in their best interest. 
But perhaps the most compelling reason for pursuing improved relations through détente 
was the superpowers’ agreement that nuclear war had become an unacceptable risk. Kissinger 
acknowledged that, “each side has the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it.”193 He 
concluded that the “world’s fears of holocaust and hopes for a better future have both hinged on 
the relationship between the two super-powers. In an era of strategic nuclear balance – when 
both sides have the capacity to destroy civilized life – there is no alternative to coexistence.”194 
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Dobrynin agreed that to the Soviet Union “nuclear war was utterly unacceptable.”195 In a top 
secret communique to President Nixon, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev even 
proposed a heretofore unthinkable step beyond coexistence. In an idea he said “would guarantee 
a world free of nuclear war,” he proposed a treaty whereby the Soviet Union and the United 
States would “jointly retaliate against a [nuclear] attack” on the other.196  
Under these conditions President Richard Nixon, along with his National Security 
Advisor and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, designed the Soviet foreign policy of 
détente. The twin goals of their policy were to create a stable relationship with the Soviet Union 
that could ensure world peace and to firmly establish American world leadership. Kissinger set 
out “to reclaim for the United States its position as the dominant player in world affairs that it 
had, arguably, lost as the result of the Vietnam War.”197 Kissinger concluded that “there can be 
no peaceful international order without a constructive relationship between the United States and 
the Soviet Union.”198 Nixon met Brezhnev at the 1972 Moscow Summit and signed a landmark 
document called the U.S.-Soviet Basic Principles Agreement that would guide the development 
of this constructive relationship.
199
 These principles included the importance of avoiding 
confrontations, the desire for peaceful coexistence, and the renunciation of spheres of influence 
in the world.
200
  
Stemming from these principles, Nixon’s policy of détente had three major prongs. The 
first prong was negotiations on strategic arms limitations. President Nixon successfully 
negotiated the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) in which the superpowers agreed to 
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“cap the number of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles each side could 
deploy.”201 The second prong was linkage between economic, political, and military cooperation. 
Nixon believed the Soviets should “be brought to understand that they cannot expect to reap the 
benefits of co-operation in one area while seeking to take advantage of tension or confrontation 
elsewhere.”202 According to Kissinger, the purpose of linkage was to give the Soviets “economic 
concessions in return for political stabilization.”203 The third prong was the Nixon Doctrine 
which created a transformational change to America’s longstanding policy of containment. 
Under this doctrine America would continue to defend its NATO allies, but when friendly 
governments outside the NATO alliance found themselves under military threat, they would be 
encouraged to handle their own defense.
204
 With this declaration, Nixon intended to prevent 
costly American entanglements such as such as the Vietnam War. 
 To avoid confrontation and advance détente, Nixon and Brezhnev had jointly agreed to 
noninterference in each other’s internal affairs. The Basic Principles Agreement signed at the 
Moscow Summit emphasized that the “differences in ideology and in the social systems of the 
USA and the USSR are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on 
the principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs.”205 This was in essence 
“the first time an American administration maintained that communist ideology was no obstacle 
to having a fruitful relationship with another nation.”206 In fact, in a television address during his 
historic Moscow Summit trip, Nixon stated, “The only sound basis for a peaceful and 
progressive international order is sovereign equality and mutual respect. We believe in the right 
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of each nation to chart its own course . . . without interference from other nations.”207 As a result, 
Nixon’s policy of détente lacked any emphasis on the freedoms and human rights so ingrained in 
American ideology.  
 Although Nixon’s policy of détente appeased the Soviet’s poor record on human rights, it 
did not appease the Soviet’s tumultuous relationship with its Communist rival, China. In his 
highly secretive and historic trip in 1972, Nixon established diplomatic relations with China and 
his strategy of triangular diplomacy. The two nations shared an interest in settling the Vietnam 
conflict. Nixon wanted a respectable exit for the United States; China wanted to end the fighting 
on its southern border so it could concentrate on the Soviet threat to its northern border.
208
 
President Nixon and Chairman Mao Tse Tung signed the Shanghai Communique which stated 
that neither the United States nor the People’s Republic of China would seek dominance in the 
Asia-Pacific sphere, but would oppose any nation who did.
209
 With this agreement, Nixon 
created a situation where America could “play its Cold War adversaries against each other” at a 
time when China and the Soviet Union “were by then so hostile to one another that they 
competed for Washington’s favor.”210    
 The Helsinki accords at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe did not 
play an important role in President Nixon’s policy of détente. Nixon initially expressed two 
concerns. First, he was skeptical of Brezhnev’s motives for the conference, believing the Soviets 
were using it to give Moscow greater control over Eastern Europe.
211
 Second, he worried that the 
conference would threaten American leadership in NATO by encouraging Congress to reduce 
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U.S. forces in Europe.
212
 As such, Dobrynin noted that “the United States had initially been 
demonstratively indifferent” to the Helsinki Conference “in the belief that it had nothing to 
gain.”213 However, Nixon eventually agreed to U.S. participation when the Soviets expressed its 
willingness to use the conference as a means to discuss mutually balanced force reductions 
(MBFR) in Europe.
214
 As negotiations for the conference began in 1973, the Soviets and their 
East European allies sought to advance the confirmation of post-WWII borders while the West 
European allies sought to advance a human rights agenda.  
Nixon and Kissinger took a position of appeasement toward both the Soviet Union and 
Western allies during the initial conference negotiations. Kissinger reflected, “We didn’t want to 
break with our allies or confront the Soviets.”215 When the Soviets worried that the human rights 
elements of the negotiations would undermine the Soviet regime, Kissinger stated the United 
States would “use its influence not to embarrass the Soviet Union or raise provocative issues.”216 
Kissinger also urged his Western allies to be more flexible on their human rights demands during 
the negotiations. He irritated his NATO allies when asking for this flexibility and declaring the 
Soviet system “would not be changed if Western newspapers were put on sale in a few kiosks in 
Moscow.”217 Kissinger admitted that during the Nixon administration, the “CSCE was never an 
element of US foreign policy. We never pushed it and stayed a half step behind our allies in the 
process.”218 It is doubtful that President Nixon would have even attended the conference in 
Helsinki if he had remained in office. 
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 Gerald Ford assumed responsibility for America’s foreign policy when he took over the 
presidency upon Nixon’s resignation in 1974. Ford confirmed that Nixon’s two goals of world 
peace and American leadership would remain his own goals. In his vice presidential 
confirmation hearings he had stated that among the most important roles of a president was 
“achieving peace throughout the world.”219 And he underscored this goal in his Swearing in 
Address when he stated his intent to lead a “sincere search for peace.”220 He similarly asserted 
his goal of American global leadership. In his Foreign Policy Address to Congress in April, 
1975, Ford recalled, “The leadership of the United States of America, since the end of World 
War Two, has sustained and advanced the security, well-being, and freedom of millions of 
human beings” and repeated President Truman’s belief that “If we falter in our leadership, we 
may endanger the peace of the world.”221 
 To achieve these two goals, Ford assured foreign leaders that he intended to continue the 
key elements of Nixon’s policy of détente with the Soviet Union. Ford immediately sent a letter 
to Brezhnev with this assurance.
222
 Brezhnev responded favorably to this declaration in a letter to 
Nixon during the transition saying, “We have received with satisfaction President Ford’s 
statement of his intentions to continue the course in our relations aimed at their further 
broadening and deepening.”223 Ford’s announcement to retain Henry Kissinger as Secretary of 
State further solidified his intent to continue the policy of détente. Dobrynin worried that Ford 
was “well known in the [Soviet Union] for his sharply uncompromising statements as a 
congressman about the Soviet Union.”224 However, on the day he was sworn in, Ford met with 
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Dobrynin to assure him that “as president he now would be much more discreet in his public 
statements.”225 Ford later informed a joint session of Congress that, “The United States and the 
Soviet Union share an interest in lessening tensions and building a more stable relationship.”226 
Dobrynin concluded, “Despite the constitutional upheavals caused by Watergate, the transition 
from Richard Nixon to Gerald Ford was successful, and with it the continuation of the policy of 
Soviet-American détente.”227  
Ford’s détente strategies included a continuation of Nixon’s arms reduction and trade 
increases through linkage. In his Foreign Policy Address to Congress, Ford stated that, “Central 
to U.S.-Soviet relations today is the critical negotiation to control strategic nuclear weapons.”228 
To that end, Ford and Brezhnev met at the Vladivostok Summit in 1974 and successfully 
negotiated principles and a framework that would guide future long term arms reductions.
229
 
Simultaneously with arms reductions, Ford worked to expand trade with the Soviet Union.
230
 
Kissinger underscored that “one important area for invigorated cooperative action is economic 
policy.”231 Under Ford, trade with the Soviet Union had increased from under $200 million in 
1970 to greater than $2 billion in 1976.
232
 Ford leveraged his strong collaboration and 
relationship building skills during his meetings with Brezhnev. Kissinger found Ford to be a 
“superior negotiator to Nixon, due largely to his personality.”233 Similarly, Dobrynin said Ford 
was “simpler, more compassionate, and approachable” than Nixon.234  
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Despite the continuation of détente through pleasant relations, there were clear 
differences between Ford and Nixon’s foreign policy. The first was Ford’s intention to restore 
America’s military strength while pursuing arms limitations with the Soviet Union. In a 
discussion of differences between Ford and Nixon, Kissinger informed Dobrynin that Ford “did 
not purposely promote the arms race, but was devoted to the patriotic idea of ‘a strong 
America.’”235 Kissinger also admitted in a conversation with Chinese Vice Premier of the State 
Council Teng, that although “there was no difference between President Nixon’s policy toward 
the Soviet Union and President Ford’s, that President Ford is a nuance tougher toward the Soviet 
Union.”236 This toughness translated into a commitment to maintain America’s strong military. 
In his Foreign Policy Address to Congress, Ford unequivocally stated, “As long as I am 
president, America will maintain is strength.”237 He stated with conviction, “Let no ally doubt 
our determination to maintain a defense that is second to none” and forcefully warned, “Let no 
potential adversary believe that our difficulties or our debates mean a slackening of our national 
will.”238 To his NATO allies he committed, “Our military power remains, and will continue to 
remain, second to none – of this let there be no doubt.”239 According to Ford’s brand of détente, 
arms limitations coexisted with military strength. Where Nixon had begun to appease the Soviets 
as partners, Ford referred to them as adversaries and stated, “Improvement of relations with 
adversaries does not mean any relaxation of our national vigilance. On the contrary, it is the firm 
maintenance of both strength and vigilance that makes possible steady progress toward a safer 
and more peaceful world.”240  
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 The second difference between Ford and Nixon’s foreign policy was their stand on 
human rights. Ford brought human rights to the forefront of his foreign policy. He saw them as 
an inherently important moral foundation to foreign policy in a way that Richard Nixon had not. 
As a congressman in 1969, Ford had declared that “the greatest hypocrisy” was closing “our eyes 
to the wrongs that the Soviet Union has done to millions of human beings deprived of individual 
freedoms and national independence.”241  During his vice presidential confirmation hearings, 
Ford stated that the U.S. should look to use trade and the American market as a way to 
incentivize human rights with its foreign trading partners.
242
 Ford recognized that this wasn’t 
easy when he said, “There becomes a point, however, where you just can’t tell another country 
they have to do it” but concluded, “We can certainly try.”243 Once he became president, Ford put 
this belief to practice. The briefing book prepared for his foreign policy debate during the 1976 
election retrospectively captured the human rights stance the Ford administration had taken. This 
book described Ford’s goals saying, “The objectives of freedom for all men and women, the 
dignity and security of the individual, and the sanctity of law must always be fundamental to our 
foreign policy.”244 In a complete reversal of Nixon’s declaration of nonintervention at the 
Moscow Summit, Ford went on to say in this book, “My administration has spoken out 
forcefully for human rights and supports strengthening the international protection of human 
rights.”245 To underscore this point, Ford hand wrote in the margin, “We stand on moral 
principles.”246   
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As a member of the Ford administration, even Secretary of State Kissinger now began 
discussing the importance of human rights. In a September 1974 speech, Kissinger stated, “As 
security concerns recede, humane concerns come again to the fore.”247 Having previously 
assured the Soviets he would use American influence to avoid Soviet embarrassment on human 
rights issues at the Helsinki Conference, Kissinger now stated, “We shall insist on responsible 
behavior by the Soviet Union and use it as the primary index of our relationship. Beyond this we 
will use our influence to the maximum to alleviate suffering and to respond to humane 
appeals.”248 In a subsequent speech leading up to the Helsinki Conference, Kissinger reminded 
Americans that, “We have always stood for something beyond ourselves – a beacon to the 
oppressed from other lands” and “the United States will speak up for human rights in appropriate 
international forums and exchanges with other governments.”249 This marked change in 
Kissinger’s stance on human rights occurred concurrently with the presidential transition from 
Nixon to Ford.  
 In light of his greater commitment to military strength and human rights leadership, 
President Ford placed significantly greater importance on the Helsinki accords and the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe than President Nixon. Ford decided to 
elevate America’s role from passive appeasement to proactive leadership. In his Foreign Policy 
Address to Congress, he stated the importance of setting a realistic agenda for détente and “one 
item on that agenda must be to assure that the promises made in the [upcoming] Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe are translated into action to advance freedom and human 
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dignity for all Europeans.”250 And a now fully aligned Kissinger echoed this sentiment with 
similar rhetoric in a speech of his own stating his desire “to conclude the conference on 
European security and cooperation in a manner that promotes both security and human 
aspirations.”251 Unlike Nixon, President Ford committed to attend the conference in person. 
President Ford’s Leadership Challenges 
 Although Ford intended to play this assertive leadership role, he faced unprecedented 
headwinds as he sought to advance his foreign policy and the Helsinki Conference.  Kissinger 
recalled, “No new president since Harry S. Truman inherited quite the same gamut of foreign 
policy challenges in his first few weeks in office, and none since Lincoln in so uncongenial a 
domestic environment.”252 The nation was in crisis on two fronts. The first was a failing 
economy driven by the unprecedented coexistence of inflation and unemployment.  The second 
was the lack of trust in the American executive branch brought on by the scandals of the 
Vietnam War and Watergate.  Trust in the executive branch reached an all-time low of only 40 
percent in 1974.
253
 Stemming from these towering crises of economic failure and mistrust in the 
office of the president, President Ford faced several daunting leadership challenges as he sought 
to advance his foreign policy and the Helsinki accords.  
The first challenge was neo-isolationism where a wounded public began to resist 
American involvement in world affairs. Ford reflected in his 1977 State of the Union address, 
“In the grave situation which prevailed in August, 1974, our will to maintain our international 
leadership was in doubt.”254 American optimism from post-World War II economic growth, 
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communist containment, and the moon landing had disappeared.
255
 The pessimism that replaced 
it caused Americans to turn inward with a desire to withdraw from world affairs. In 1974, fully 
“one-quarter of Americans described themselves as ‘isolationist.’”256 A 1975 Harris poll revealed 
that only 39 percent of Americans supported “military intervention to defend Western 
Europe.”257 As an ardent internationalist, Ford acknowledged, but firmly resisted, this emerging 
view. In 1973 Ford had warned European allies that if they opposed a mutual troop reduction 
pact with the Soviets, Congress would likely demand U.S. troop reductions overseas.
258
 He 
warned them that there was a growing sentiment among the public to bring American troops 
home and admitted, “I don’t like it, but it is a fact of life.”259 Facing this difficult neo-isolationist 
sentiment, President Ford resisted congressional and public pressure to focus on the nation’s 
crippling domestic issues at the expense of asserting America’s leadership abroad with initiatives 
such as America’s active participation in the Helsinki accords. 
 The second leadership challenge Ford faced was a highly critical media. Frustrated by the 
secrecy and lies of the Johnson and Nixon administrations, the press became increasingly 
aggressive. Ford’s Press Secretary Ron Nessen said, “It was the period after Watergate and 
Vietnam and we had a pretty low opinion of our leaders. . . . So there was that kind of cynicism 
that colored all the reporting.”260 He recalled a prevailing sense that the media “had grown 
contemptuous” in how it covered the president and “Ford had become the first victim of that.”261 
Presidential Assistant James Cannon said, “I think the media never did justice to President Ford. 
. . . Some reporters wrote story after story suggesting that he was dull, kind of bumbling 
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physically, and lacking in charisma.”262 Ford gave the media further fodder with unfortunate 
falls. While traveling to meet with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in Vienne, Ford stumbled 
and fell from the plane.
263
 Nessen concluded, “It is true that ridicule is a damaging weapon, and 
of course Ford was ridiculed by Johnny Carson in his monologue every night, and by Chevy 
Chase on Saturday Night Live.”264 These portrayals irreparably damaged Ford’s image as a 
leader by implying “congruence between Ford’s athletic missteps and his intellectual powers.”265 
It became increasingly difficult for Ford to advance his foreign policy of détente and the 
important role of Helsinki accords in the face of such a critical, unforgiving, and even harassing 
media.   
 The third and most serious challenge Ford faced was the power shift from the executive 
branch to the legislative branch. This power shift resulted in a marked increase in congressional 
involvement in foreign policy. Stung by the lies and secrecy of previous administrations, the 
Congress “ached to reclaim some of the power lost to the executive branch.”266 Ironically, Ford 
had encouraged this shift as a congressman. In a 1965 speech Ford had said, “there are disturbing 
signs of slow erosion in the power of the legislature, build-up of awesome power in the 
executive, and regrettable change in the intended direction of the Judiciary. Each is a threat to 
freedom.”267 Motivated by this sentiment, Nixon’s foreign policy “provoked Congress into 
reclaiming much of the authority over the conduct of national security policy that it had 
abdicated during the early Cold War.”268 Ford was the first president to battle this immensely 
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suspicious Congress.
269
 Kissinger found that his “policies were now under much tighter 
congressional scrutiny and the conduct of secret diplomacy had become all but impossible.”270 
 President Ford proactively nurtured a more collaborative relationship with Congress than 
Kissinger. However, the power shift resulted in the passage of legislation that placed severe 
restrictions on his ability to run foreign policy. For example, Congress passed the War Powers 
Act in 1973 designed to restrict presidential authority over troop deployment. This highly 
restrictive act “imposed a sixty-day limit on all future military deployments without 
congressional consent.”271 Another example was the Budget Impoundment and Control Act 
designed to increase congressional control over defense spending. This act “allowed Congress to 
intervene if the president cut spending or cancelled program.”272 It also established the 
Congressional Budget Office so instead of simply accepting the president’s budget, Congress 
was “now armed with its own arsenal of experts, figures, and facts” with regard to defense and 
military spending. 
273
 Yet another example was the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade 
Reform Act of 1975. This act prevented the Soviet Union from gaining its sought after Most 
Favored Nation status with the United Stated by making this status conditional on compliance 
with greater Jewish emigration freedom from the Soviet Union.
274
 A final crippling example was 
Senator Jackson’s arms equality resolution. This resolution required equality in all weapons 
systems in the SALT II negotiations, as opposed to the weapons asymmetry principle that 
governed the SALT I negotiations.
275
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These executive branch restrictions severely hampered the U.S.-Soviet relationship upon 
which the successful execution of détente and the Helsinki accords depended. These actions 
infuriated both Ford and Brezhnev. President Ford stated that, “Congress was more rebellious 
and assertive of its rights and privileges – and also more irresponsible – than it had been for 
years.”276 Dobrynin himself said that, “probably no other single question did more to sour the 
atmosphere of détente than the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.”277 
Following the passage of the Trade Reform Act, Brezhnev wrote to Ford refusing to repay World 
War II Lend-Lease debts and declaring that “grave damage has thus been inflicted to our trade 
and economic relations.”278 In his Foreign Policy Address, Ford admonished Congress saying 
that their irresponsible actions “have damaged our foreign policy” and resulted in lost “jobs and 
business – which could have gone to Americans.”279 These congressional controls strained 
Ford’s relationship with the Soviet Union and limited his decision making power.   
 However, the nation’s crises did provide a silver lining for President Ford. The country’s 
mistrust resulted in an increased demand for morality in government. Although he faced a neo-
isolationist public, a cynical press, and a controlling Congress, this demand for morality played 
to Ford’s leadership strength of integrity. The nation’s problems sparked a prevailing “discontent 
with the world as it was, whether that meant the nuclear arms race, social and economic 
injustice, the war in Vietnam, repression in Eastern Europe.”280 The Watergate scandal had 
illustrated that Americans were more supportive of “the rule of law than the wielding of 
power.”281 President Ford embraced this demand for the rule of law when he stated in his 
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Swearing in Address, “My fellow Americans, our long national nightmare is over. Our 
Constitution works; our great Republic is a government of laws and not of men. Here, the people 
rule.”282 And this demand for morality emboldened Ford’s determination to use American 
leadership to advance global human rights in his foreign policy. Ford laid out a vision of moral 
American leadership in his Foreign Policy Address saying, “I see a compassionate America, its 
heart reaching out to orphans, to refugees and to our fellow human beings afflicted by war and 
tyranny and hunger.”283 He appealed to God to be America’s moral compass saying, “And may 
God ever guide us to do what is right.”284  
President Ford did not have the freedoms and powers that his predecessors had enjoyed in 
the foreign policy arena. The United States was resistant to Ford’s policy of détente due to its 
neo-isolationist sentiment, tried to control it with a shift in power from the executive branch to 
Congress, and criticized it in the era of heightened media cynicism. This combination of the 
challenges, along with the demand for morality that sprung from the nation’s crises, offered Ford 
a unique leadership opportunity at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at 
Helsinki in 1975. But unlike other foreign policy actions he tried to advance, his participation at 
the Helsinki Conference could not be prevented by Congress. Because the Helsinki agreement 
was a political and not a legal document, it did not require congressional approval. He could 
justify his leadership participation to a neo-isolationist public and a critical media by credibly 
leveraging his goal of advancing human and political freedom that was rooted in the principles of 
own his widely acknowledged integrity. The Helsinki Conference had the potential to be a 
powerful platform to restore confidence in the integrity of the American government both at 
home and abroad. 
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Ford’s Helsinki Conference Leadership: Negotiating with Collaborative Compromise 
 The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would be “the largest 
gathering of European heads of state since the Congress of Vienna in 1815.”285 Ford believed the 
conference was an important “mission of peace and progress” with provisions that “represent 
political as well as moral” commitments.286 He said these are commitments “I have supported 
through my entire public life” including the “aspirations of freedom and national independence 
of peoples everywhere.”287 In sharp contrast to his predecessor’s passive role, President Ford 
chose to play an active role in the conference leveraging the beliefs and leadership strengths he 
had developed throughout his military and congressional career. First, he used his collaboration 
skills to bring the negotiations for human rights, self-determination, and the agreement for arms 
reduction talks to a successful close. Second, he used his relationship building skills and courage 
in the face of opposition to attend the conference in person in despite tremendous public, media, 
and congressional pressure to forgo the conference. Third, he used his collaborative relationship 
building strengths to conduct extensive and visible personal diplomacy to advance America’s 
relationships with East European nations, West European allies, and the Soviet Union throughout 
the conference. Finally, Ford delivered a speech that clearly asserted his internationalist stance 
on America’s leadership role in world peace and challenged the signatories to uphold the 
important promises of human and political freedoms they would make in signing the Final Act. 
The Final Act that would be signed by 35 participating nations and the Vatican contained 
agreements on political and military cooperation, economic cooperation, and humanitarian 
cooperation. Importantly, the document would provide a standard by which the nations could 
assess each other’s compliance with the agreements.     
                                                          
285
 Ford, A Time to Heal, 298. 
286
 Ibid., 298. 
287
 Ford, “President Ford’s Departure Statement,” Speech, Washington, D.C., 26 July 1975, 4. 
61 
 
President Ford began his leadership with an elevation in America’s participation in the 
negotiations of the agreements in the Helsinki Final Act. In a significant departure from the 
passive appeasement approach taken by the Nixon administration, Ford said with international 
fervor, “The United States will participate fully in this process” because “American security and 
well-being are tied to the security and the stability of Europe.”288 The first negotiation 
achievement was an agreement on arms reductions talks. Brezhnev had been determined to bring 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to fruition in order to gain the 
acknowledgement of post-World War II borders by the NATO allies. According to Kissinger, 
Soviet ardor for the conference had left them to be exploited in three ways, one of which was the 
initiation of Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks.
289
 In exchange for his presence at the 
conference, Ford demanded talks on mutual strategic arms and troop reductions in Europe.
290
 
Ford declared of the negotiations, “The Warsaw Pact nations met important Western 
preconditions” including “the force reduction talks now underway in Vienna before our 
agreement to go to Helsinki.”291 In a meeting in February 1975 during the negotiations, Kissinger 
and Gromyko issued a joint statement agreeing “that active efforts should be made to achieve 
positive results in mutual reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe.”292  
 The Ford administration’s second negotiation achievement was the inclusion of political 
rights to peaceful border settlement in the Helsinki Final Act. According to Ford, “in exchange 
for our agreement that ‘legitimate’ postwar boundaries were inviolable, the Soviets had conceded 
that national borders could be changed by peaceful means” which Ford believed “represented a 
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real victory for our foreign policy.”293 He reasoned that “the Russian tanks that had rolled into 
Prague in 1968 were implementing the Brezhnev Doctrine that said the Soviets had the right to 
intervene militarily to keep their client states in line. At Helsinki they would be renouncing that 
policy.”294 Ford declared of this agreement, “We have obtained the public commitment of the 
Warsaw Pact governments to the possibility of peaceful adjustment of frontiers” which is “a 
major concession” from the Soviet Union.295 Dobrynin concurred with Ford’s assessment of the 
negotiations stating, “in exchange for the recognition of frontiers established after the war, the 
Soviet Union recognized the lawfulness of changing national boundaries in Europe ‘by peaceful 
means,’” which he admitted had “preserved the possibility of reunifying Germany.”296  
The Ford administration’s third and most difficult negotiation achievement was the 
inclusion of human rights in the Helsinki Final Act in partnership with his Western allies. Human 
rights were placed on the Helsinki agenda by the European Community when negotiations began 
in 1972. 
297
 However, according to Dobrynin, “the Soviet Union did all it could to diminish the 
significance of the [human rights principles] of the [Final Act’s] third basket, for it still believed 
humanitarian issues to be domestic matters.”298 The Soviet negotiators argued that “human rights 
and self-determination were not relevant to relations among European states.”299 Nixon had 
acquiesced. However, Ford decided to actively support his Western allies in their quest to 
advance human rights. Ford insisted that the Soviet Union agree to follow standards for human 
rights and the free movement of people and ideas across Europe as part of the Helsinki 
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agreements.
300
 As the negotiations were underway, Ford summarized his approach to these 
human rights negotiations in a personal meeting with Pope John Paul VI saying, “We do not 
think the Western European nations should capitulate and give in to Russia. We urge our allies to 
insist on substance so that the Warsaw Pact nations do not prevail.”301 He invited the Pope to 
assert his influence as well stating, “Any influence in that area would be to the best advantage of 
mankind.”302  
Under Ford’s leadership, it was Kissinger who played an instrumental role in bringing the 
final human rights agreement to closure. Despite his previous ambivalence toward the 
negotiations, he now urged Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to accept the human rights 
conditions requested by the West.
303
 In the spring of 1975, a team of NATO delegates advanced 
a proposal for increased human contact and the free flow of information to be included in Basket 
Three of the Final Act.
304
 Kissinger subsequently met with Gromyko and informed him that this 
proposal was the “West’s absolute precondition for closure” on the Final Act.305 According to 
Kissinger, “on the so-called Basket 3, which contains the human rights provisions, the outcome 
of the conference was substantially a Soviet acceptance of a joint Western proposal that was 
made as a final agreed position in early May [1975].”306 In exchange for making the human 
rights concession, the Soviets won the concession of the ‘non-intervention in internal affairs’ 
clause appearing ahead of the human rights clause in the Final Act.
307
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With Soviet acceptance of this proposal, the negotiations steered by President Ford were 
complete. Kissinger held a news conference that announced the outcome of the negotiations and 
Ford’s intention to attend the forthcoming Helsinki Conference in July saying,   
 “The position the United States took throughout the conference was that we 
would attend the conference at the highest level if . . . sufficient progress were 
made to justify it. That ‘sufficient progress’ in the so-called Basket 3 on human 
rights and progress on military provisions of the advance notifications of 
maneuvers and, finally, on the clause with respect to peaceful change in Basket 1 
on the statement of principles . . . were substantially attained.”308  
 
 The two years of intensive negotiations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe that spanned from July 1973 through June 1975 resulted in a document called the 
Helsinki Final Act. The Final Act included four baskets of principles and agreements. Basket 
One was entitled “Questions Relating to Security in Europe” and dealt with the political and 
military foundations of maintaining peace in Europe. The countries aligned on a principle to 
jointly promote peace. This principle stated agreement to a common goal of “promoting better 
relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and 
lasting peace from any threat to or attempt against their security.”309 Several agreements 
followed in order to obtain this goal. Importantly, the countries agreed to respect each other’s 
sovereign equality, along with the right to independently select their own political, social, 
economic, and cultural systems.
310
 As a result of this sovereign equality, the nations agreed to the 
right of self-determination. Each nation had the right to determine “their internal and external 
political status, without external influence” and this included their right to “belong or not to 
belong to international organizations.”311 Consistent with Brezhnev’s original goals of 
recognizing post-World War II boundaries, they agreed to “regard as inviolable all one another’s 
                                                          
308
 Kissinger, “Secretary Kissinger’s News Conference of July 25,” CSCE, Helsinki, Finland, 25 July 1975. 
309
 “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act,” The Department of State Bulletin, 323. 
310
 Ibid,. 324. 
311
 Ibid., 324 and 325. 
65 
 
frontiers” and agreed to “refrain now and in the future from assaulting those frontiers.”312 
However, they further agreed that frontiers could be changed only by “peaceful means and by 
agreement” and agreed to refrain from the use of “threat or force” against each other.313 With this 
agreement, the Soviet Union essentially revoked the Brezhnev Doctrine. With regard to military 
matters, the nations agreed to pursue efforts that would reduce the likelihood of confrontation. 
They agreed to pursue disarmament and agreed to notify each other of military maneuvers.
314
  
Perhaps the most radical agreements in Basket One were those regarding human rights. 
For the first time, nations from the East and West jointly agreed in writing to respect 
fundamental human rights. The nations agreed to respect “freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”315 
Additionally, they agreed to uphold the principles held in the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
316
 When this U.N. document was originally developed in 1948, 
the Soviet Union had abstained from signing it. In an attempt to protect himself from internal 
accountability on these rights, Brezhnev had assured the inclusion of the right to non-
intervention in internal affairs. In this clause, the nations agreed to “refrain from any 
intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling 
within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating state.”317 What Ford and the West 
believed would preserve a degree of independence for the Eastern European satellites, Brezhnev 
believed would enable him to ignore upholding human rights internally. 
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 Basket Two focused on economic cooperation and was entitled “Cooperation in the Field 
of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment.” This set of agreements was 
essential given of the widespread economic decline of the times suffered by both Eastern and 
Western nations. The principle foundation of this basket was an acknowledgement that “the 
growing world-wide economic interdependence calls for increasingly common and effective 
efforts towards the solution of major world economic problems” and that “cooperation in these 
fields would promote economic and social progress and the improvement of the conditions of 
life.”318 First, the nations agreed to promote the expansion of mutual trade. To do this, they 
agreed to “improve conditions for the expansion of contacts” between organizations including 
corporations and banks.
319
 Furthermore, they agreed to share “economic and commercial 
information,” as well as encourage effective marketing, industrial development, and 
technological development.
320
 Finally, they agreed to jointly promote the “protection and 
improvement of the environment” as they pursued these economic endeavors.321 Just as the first 
basket advanced peace as a mutually beneficial goal, the second advanced economic 
improvement as a mutually beneficial goal. 
 Basket Three focused on the advancement of human rights and was entitled “Cooperation 
in Humanitarian and Other Fields.” The foundational principle of this basket was the goal of 
“strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples” and the acknowledgment of the need 
to pursue this goal by facilitating “freer movement and contacts, individually and collectively, 
whether privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organizations of the participating 
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States.”322 The first set of agreements regarded the increase of human contacts. The states agreed 
to promote reunification of families, enable freer travel, promote contact among young people, 
and encourage sport competitions across their borders.
323
 The second set of agreements regarded 
the freer exchange of information. The states agreed to promote increased exchange of oral, 
printed, filmed, and broadcast information.
324
 This included agreement to promote “increased 
cooperation among mass media organizations” as well as to “improve the conditions under 
which journalists from one participating State exercise their profession in another participating 
State.”325 These agreements had heretofore been completely incongruous with Communist 
ideology.   
 Basket Four provided the means for ensuring the Final Act agreements would live on 
beyond the Helsinki Conference and was entitled “Follow Up to the Conference.” This basket 
established procedures to allow the participants to review compliance and hold each other 
accountable for compliance to their agreements. Kissinger stated that this basket “provides for 
unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions designed to carry forward the work of the conference 
and monitor the implementation of agreed texts.”326 Specifically, participants were called upon to 
“declare their resolve, in the period following the Conference, to pay due regard to and 
implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference.”327 To achieve this objective, they 
agreed to a meeting in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 1977.
328
 This important basket gave the 
document its teeth and illustrated the commitment of each participatory state. 
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President Ford was proud of the accomplishments made during his administration’s 
negotiations of the Helsinki accords. He believed the Final Act greatly favored the Western 
alliance. He supported the political agreements of the peaceful settlement of disputes, the right to 
self-determination, and greater human rights in the form of freer movement of people and ideas 
across borders. Additionally, he supported the agreement for greater trade between the signatory 
nations during a time of global economic crisis. Ford was delighted with this outcome stating, 
“We are getting public commitment by the leaders of the more closed and controlled countries to 
a greater measure of freedom and movement for individuals, information, and ideas than has 
existed there in the past and establishing a yard stick by which the world can measure how well 
they live up to these stated intentions.”329 Jose A. Cabranes, an authority on international law and 
vice president of the International League for Human Rights, further concurred with Ford’s 
positive assessment and said, “Careful reading of the Helsinki [documents] will confirm that the 
Soviet Union did not achieve its principal objectives.”330 With its agreement on the peaceful 
settlement of frontiers, the Final Act “did not endorse the Brezhnev Doctrine.”331 He further 
stated, “The Soviet bloc did not obtain a surrogate World War II peace treaty” or a “commitment 
to the immutability of present frontiers.”332 Nor did the United States, Britain, and France 
concede their rights in Germany.
333
  
In contrast to Ford’s buoyant assessment of the Final Act, Brezhnev and the Soviet 
leaders of the Politburo were angered by the outcome of the negotiations. Brezhnev had aspired 
to use the Helsinki Final Act to build his image as global peace maker, to force the West to 
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acknowledge the borders for which the Soviet Union had suffered to acquire, and to quell 
internal dissent.
334
 The inviolability of frontiers and the non-intervention into internal affairs 
agreements in Basket One were viewed as key elements toward those aspirations. However, after 
having entrusted the final negotiations to Gromyko, Brezhnev and the Politburo were shocked by 
the human rights concessions. These leaders “had grave doubts about assuming international 
commitments that could open the way to foreign interference” in internal Soviet affairs and 
engaged in serious debate over whether Brezhnev should sign the document.
335
 According to 
Dobrynin, “the dispute continued until the very opening of the ceremony.”336 Ultimately, 
Brezhnev supported Gromyko’s argument that “the main goal for the Soviet Union . . . had been 
the general recognition of postwar boundaries” and the human rights principles were of little 
consequence because with the non-interference clause, “We are still masters in our own 
house.”337  
Ford’s Helsinki Conference Leadership: Courage to Attend in the Face of Opposition 
 President Ford’s decision to shift from tolerant appeasement to proactive leadership with 
the Soviet Union during the Final Act negotiations certainly demanded a certain measure of 
courage. However, it was his decision to attend the conference in Helsinki in the face of 
tremendous opposition that demanded the kind of courage he had developed throughout his 
career. The nation’s burgeoning neo-isolationist sentiment manifested itself in strong popular 
opposition to Helsinki Conference. Opposition came from Congress, the media, and the public. 
 Congressional opposition was predictable given the power shift to the legislative branch 
and came from both Democrats and Republicans. Democratic opponents on one extreme 
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believed the Helsinki accords “put a seal of approval on the political division of Europe” since 
the incorporation of the Baltic nations into the Soviet Union “by military action in World War 
II.”338 Democratic Senator Henry Jackson subscribed to this opinion and accused Ford of “taking 
us backward, not forward, in the genuine search for peace” while publically urging not to attend 
the conference.
339
  Conservatives were furious about this as well, comparing it to the 1944 Yalta 
Conference, where it was believed that President Roosevelt had betrayed Eastern Europe to the 
Soviets.
340
 Republican opponents on the other extreme believed the Helsinki accords were 
meaningless because they were only unenforceable principles. They worried, however, that the 
principles might result in an allied weakening of defense against the Soviet Union. They feared 
the Helsinki accords would make “free governments of Western Europe and North America less 
wary and lead to a letting down of NATO’s political guard and military defenses.”341 Even 
Dobrynin acknowledged the Ford Administration’s support of the Helsinki accords was being 
criticized by Congress as “excessive tolerance to Moscow, and Communism in general” that 
signaled “détente was benefiting the Soviet Union and not the United States.”342  
The cynical media of the time supported this collective congressional opposition. The 
New York Times declared the Helsinki accords “misguided and meaningless.”343 Herb Kaplow 
of ABC stated, “As far as the U.S. foreign policy formulators are concerned, this is an 
opportunity we could have missed.”344 The Wall Street Journal was more blunt and ran an article 
with a headline that read: “Jerry Don’t Go.”345  
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While Ford expected such congressional opposition, he failed to anticipate the equally 
strong public opposition. When he reviewed his mail, he discovered he had received “558 letters 
against the Helsinki agreement and only thirty-two in favor of it.”346 Ford admitted that he did 
not foresee “the outrage that the trip would provoke among Americans of Eastern European 
descent.”347 One vocal provocateur that sparked this opposition was the exiled Soviet dissident, 
Aleksandyr Solzhenitsyn who issued a strong statement condemning Helsinki saying, “The 
president will shortly be leaving for Europe to sign . . . the betrayal of Eastern Europe – to 
acknowledge officially its slavery forever. Had I the hope of dissuading him from signing the 
treaty, I myself would seek such a meeting. However, there is no such hope.”348 Americans of 
East European descent expressed similar concerns. The Nationalities Council in Ford’s own state 
of Michigan called an emergency session of members representing Polish, Ukrainian, 
Lithuanian, Slovak, Croatian, Hungarian, Albanian, Latvian, Estonian, and Bylorussian people to 
discuss their objection. They sent Ford an urgent and heartfelt mailgram expressing their concern 
that the Helsinki accords solidify Russia’s hegemony over Eastern Europe and appease Soviet 
subjugation of its citizens. They forthrightly stated, “We are alarmed at the news of your planned 
presence at Helsinki. Your trip brings back the memory of the trip that Mr. Roosevelt [sic] to 
Yalta.”349 They continued, “The consequence of that trip lingers with us to this day.”350 They 
further reminded Ford, “America has the responsibility for maintaining world peace which 
however cannot be obtained by bowing to the wishes of the Kremlin and imprisonment of 
millions of human beings” who are “living under Russian tyranny.”351 
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In light of this public and congressional outrage, President Ford invited representatives of 
Eastern European communities, along with their Representatives, to meet with him the day 
before his planned departure for Helsinki. The members of this group candidly expressed their 
concerns to Ford. Mr. Joseph Lesawry, President of the Ukrainian National Association, stated, 
“Mr. President we are concerned about the dissidents in the Soviet Union.”352 Dr. Lev 
Dobrianski, the President of the Ukrainian-American Congress, warned that, “Moscow is going 
to make Helsinki a prime propaganda tool – they are going to make use of it.”353 Representative 
Edward Derwinski spoke for his constituents stating, “They are fearful that [the Helsinki 
accords] are giving up the rights of millions who are struggling to make sure they have their 
freedom.”354 Ford listened to these arguments almost without interruption. 
 Ford defended his decision to attend the conference and articulated his rationale to this 
group. First, he justified the Helsinki Conference as a mission of peace. He stated, “The Helsinki 
Conference is linked with our overall policy of working to reduce East-West tensions and 
pursuing peace.”355 Although this was primarily a European initiative, Ford believed American 
participation was essential to the maintenance of strong NATO alliances. He stated, “Our 
absence would have caused serious imbalance for the West.”356 Second, he assured the group 
that the Helsinki accords advance the human rights of the Eastern European people. He informed 
them that through the Helsinki agreements, “We were getting the public commitment by the 
leaders of the more closed and controlled countries to a greater measure of freedom and 
movement for individuals, information, and ideas.”357 Finally, he affirmed his stance on the quest 
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for independence of the Baltic States. He stated, “We continued to support the Eastern European 
peoples in their aspirations for more freedom. The United States had never recognized the Soviet 
incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and was not doing so now. No territory acquired 
in violation of international law would be recognized as legal, and the United States would not 
compromise this long-standing principle.”358 He concluded with this belief that, “If it all fails, 
Europe would be no worse off than it is now. If it succeeds . . .  the people in Eastern Europe will 
be that much better off.”359 
 Despite this overwhelming opposition, President Ford decided to attend the Helsinki 
Conference. He had listened to his opponent’s arguments and leveraged his collaborative 
relationship building strengths to compassionately argue his rationale for the visible leadership 
he intended to assert in Helsinki based on his beliefs in internationalism and peace through 
strength. Ford reflected on his decision saying, “I have always thought that the responsibility of a 
leader was to lead. If journeying anywhere offered the chance of strengthening prospects for 
peace and bettering America’s position in the world, I would embark on it.”360 And while Ford 
was certainly not pleased with The Wall Street Journal’s ‘Jerry Don’t Go’ headline he said, “I 
would rather read that than headlines all over Europe saying ‘United States Boycotts Peace 
Hopes.’”361 
 Once Ford declared his intent to attend the Helsinki Conference, some leaders 
acknowledged the courage inherent in the decision. Representative Dan Rostenkowski said, 
“This is a courageous step on your part to bring these people together. I know there are reports of 
people not being happy about your making this trip, but the fact that you have brought us 
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together and have pointed out that you are president and working in search of peace and that you 
will not be closing the door by going there is important.”362 Similarly, Dr. Kazys Bobelis, the 
President of the Lithuanian-American Council encouraged Ford’s decision and stated, “We are 
happy with the statement you have made; we believe in you. You are a champion of freedom and 
human rights.”363 Even Brezhnev acknowledged Ford’s courage and expressed his gratitude 
saying, “And I appreciated very highly the fact that you came despite criticism in the U.S.”364                           
Ford’s Helsinki Conference Leadership: Personal Diplomacy 
 Having successfully completed the negotiations of the Final Act and made the difficult 
decision to attend, Ford planned his strategy for asserting his leadership at the Helsinki 
Conference itself. Based on his strength of collaborative relationship building, one important 
strategy was visible personal diplomacy. This included an intensive and comprehensive schedule 
of meetings with NATO allies, Eastern bloc leaders, and Soviet leaders. His objectives were to 
assure NATO allies of America’s commitment to international leadership, to bolster Eastern bloc 
leaders with his personal support for their independence, and to advance the peace process with 
the Soviet Union through détente.  
Ford’s top priority on his Helsinki Conference trip was to meet with his NATO allies. 
Given America’s troubled economy and the abrupt change in leadership as a result of Nixon’s 
resignation, President Ford knew it was imperative to assure his allies that America would 
continue to lead in world affairs. He chose first to address NATO military personnel at the 
Kirschgoens base in Germany. “It is not by accident, let me assure you, that I stopped here first 
to consult with our Allies, nor that I now affirm our commitment to Berlin,” he said to the 
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troops.
365
 He firmly stated his commitment to his belief in peace through strength. He declared 
“As we pursue peace together . . . I am convinced that under present circumstances the best 
guarantee for peace is a very, very strong defense.”366 And though in just a few days he intended 
to discuss mutual balanced force reductions with Brezhnev, he committed to maintaining a 
strong defense. He promised the troops, “I will not allow our armed forces to be weakened under 
any circumstances.”367  
After confirming his commitment to peace through strength at the NATO military 
meeting, Ford met with the allied heads of state to confirm America’s leadership responsibilities 
in world affairs. In those meetings, he led discussions focused on restoring economic strength, 
achieving peace, and advancing human rights. To Federal German Chancellor Schmidt he agreed 
to economic cooperation. He stated, “We fully recognize that the economy of the United States is 
an integral part of the economy throughout the world, and particularly that of Western Europe” 
and agreed “that it is vitally important that the economic policies of Germany and the European 
Community be integrated with our own economic policies.”368 Chancellor Schmidt welcomed 
this assertive American leadership stating, “Overcoming this worldwide recession is only 
possible if the most important economy of the Western world leads the way.”369 Ford also 
celebrated the humanitarian and self-determination achievements of the Helsinki accords with 
his allies. To Chancellor Schmidt he expressed, “I am especially hopeful that the humanitarian 
contents of the Helsinki documents relating to increased contact among peoples will have special 
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meaning for all the German people – East and West – including our friends in Berlin.”370 To 
Federal German President Scheel, Ford declared, “Few people are more united than Americans 
and Germans in their support of the principles of independence, freedom, and self-
determination.”371 Schmidt expressed his appreciation of Ford’s visible leadership at the Helsinki 
Conference. He declared, “The negotiations have shown – and your presence in Helsinki, Mr. 
President, will impressively demonstrate to the entire world – that America and Europe are 
inseparably linked.”372  
Beyond his meetings with West German leaders, Ford invested in personal diplomacy 
with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs James Callahan, 
and French President Giscard d’Estaing. These discussions celebrated allied commitment to 
security and human rights. In a letter to Wilson Ford reflected, “Our participation in the Helsinki 
Conference not only contributed to a more responsible relationship with the East but also 
demonstrated Western solidarity and commitment to the cause of human rights.”373 Callahan 
respected Ford’s character and stated that, ‘“Ford always spoke with straightforward sincerity, 
simplicity, and integrity. Quickly I learned he meant what he said and would stand by it.”374 
During the discussions, Callahan remarked that as a result of the Helsinki accords, “No Soviet 
government can ever justify invasion again.”375 Ford responded with an invitation to jointly 
advance mutual arms reductions.
376
 Ford’s personal diplomacy had assured America’s allies that 
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the United States remained firmly committed to uphold its global leadership responsibilities 
under his administration.  
In addition to the personal diplomacy he conducted with his allies as part of his Helsinki 
trip, President Ford conducted visible and historic meetings with heads of three important 
Eastern European states. The purpose of these visible meetings was to encourage their 
independence from the Soviet Union.
377
 To accomplish this goal, he chose Poland, Romania, and 
Yugoslavia because he said they were the “three Eastern European states that were the least 
subservient to Moscow.”378 He publically declared at his departure, “I hope my visits to Poland, 
Romania and Yugoslavia will again demonstrate our continuing friendship and interest in the 
welfare and progress of the fine people of Eastern Europe.”379 This strategy was historic in that it 
was the first time that the leader of a democratic country had visited these parts of Eastern 
Europe.
380
  
Ford’s first visit was to Poland for a conference with Polish First Secretary Edward 
Gierek. Their discussion centered on improving the prospects of peace, economic growth, and 
increased human rights through bi-lateral efforts. Gierek warmly welcomed Ford and praised his 
personal diplomacy efforts saying, “You sir, are personally the advocate of friendly cooperation 
of our peoples and states. Your present visit to Poland is about the most eloquent testimony of 
that.”381 President Ford openly encouraged Poland to seek greater independent relations with the 
United States. He said, “I am deeply gratified by the expansion of contacts between our two 
countries, by the rapid growth in trade, and by the new forms of bilateral cooperation which have 
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been able to develop between our two nations.”382 He continued this encouragement in another 
meeting by invoking principles of the Helsinki accords both would soon sign saying, “I am 
pleased to cite the continuing efforts of both sides to increase trade and commerce, the visits and 
exchanges between our scientists” that result in “more Poles and Americans to know each other 
and exchange ideas.”383 In a joint statement, Ford and Gierek expressed their agreement to 
support military détente as an important step toward peace, increased trade as an important step 
toward economic health, and “efforts to solve humanitarian problems affecting their citizens.”384 
Importantly, they openly agreed to support the Helsinki Conference on Security and Exchange in 
Europe so that the agreements “become genuine and strong stimulus for positively shaping” their 
relationship.
385
  
 Ford’s second East European visit was to Yugoslavia for a meeting with President Josip 
Broz Tito. Their discussions centered on increasing European security through arms reduction 
and increasing economic trade. Leveraging his collaborative relationship building strength, Ford 
openly asked for Tito’s advice on achieving peace through arms reduction. In a confident 
statement that revealed the independence of his thinking, Tito stated, “I think that after Helsinki 
the moral factor will become important.”386 He further stated, “I think there is a connection 
between the reduction of arms and Helsinki. Otherwise we haven’t done much.”387 Ford then 
appealed to Tito’s independent stance and asserted, “We think dividing the world into blocs is 
not the best way to deal with the problems. In the kind of world we live in today, there can’t be 
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the kind of confrontation and military activity which took place in your time and mine.”388 To 
achieve peace, Ford promised, “I will dedicate myself to eliminating those sources of conflict 
that could lead to military confrontation.”389 As in the Polish discussion, Ford and the Yugoslav 
leaders discussed mutual economic opportunities. The Yugoslavs raised their need for an 
infusion of capital investment and their belief that the U.S. could be their biggest source.
390
 Ford 
responded affirmatively that he had been impressed by Yugoslavian economic policy and that he 
believed that such investment could help with the United States’ recession.391 In a joint 
statement, Ford and Tito expressed their strong mutual support of key Helsinki principles 
including “the maintenance of peace and stability by the peaceful settlement of disputes, and by 
adherence to the principles of independence, mutual respect and full equality of sovereign 
states.”392 
 Ford’s third Eastern European visit was to Romania for meetings with President Nicolae 
Ceausescu. Understanding the strong influence the Soviet Union aspired to hold over Romania, 
President Ford lost no time underscoring Romania’s sovereignty. In his arrival statement, he 
stated, “Among the principles we both cherish is the right of every nation to independence and 
sovereignty. We believe that every nation has the right to its own peaceful existence, without 
being threatened by force. And we believe that all states are equal under law regardless of size, 
system or level of development.”393 Ford and Ceausescu’s discussions focused on peace through 
enforcement of the Helsinki non-interference agreement and the expansion of trade. Unlike his 
Polish counterpart, Ceausescu openly expressed bitterness to Soviet interference with Romania. 
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At Ford’s request, Ceausescu showed him a map illustrating the territories Romania had lost to 
the Soviets.
394
 Ceausescu angrily stated, “Romania in some ways fared better at Hitler’s 
hands.”395 He complained that the Russians had never returned the gold bullion sent to Moscow 
for protection.
396
 Ford acknowledged Ceausescu’s concerns over the Helsinki agreement and 
invited him to share his views. Ceausescu expressed his belief that peace was at risk in Europe as 
long as the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union occupied Germany. He 
stated, “To continue to live under the aegis of the Potsdam Treaty means the risk of intervention 
at any moment. This is the essential problem.”397 He believed peace required invoking the 
Helsinki principle of sovereign equality and “putting every state involved on equal footing 
including Germany.”398 He went on to boldly recommend German reunification as the vital step 
in securing European security. He stated that it was essential to eliminate “the Potsdam status” 
would “exclude such a right of intervention in the right of intervention in the internal affairs of 
other states.”399 Despite the apparent audacity of this proposal, Ford acknowledged the potential 
of this idea responding, “I welcome real peace in Europe” and acknowledged “We need to have 
as many alternatives as possible.”400 Kissinger prophetically asserted that “knowing the Germans 
he could believe they might succeed in uniting in 15 years.”401  
Mutual trade expansion between the United States and Romania seemed to be a more 
attainable goal in the short term. Ford encouraged this expansion saying, “We are overjoyed with 
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the opportunity to expand our trade. It is of great benefit for each country.”402 He furthermore 
built bridges across the socialist and capitalist ideologies. He stated, “I fully recognize that 
economic problems are equally serious whether they are in a capitalist state or socialist state 
because they lead to human suffering. . . . I can see why there should be a higher degree of 
cooperation between capitalist and socialist societies.”403 Collectively, the personal diplomacy 
Ford conducted in Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania advanced the principles of peace, self-
determination, economic expansion, and human rights espoused in the Helsinki accords and 
fostered independent bilateral relations between the United States and the nations of Eastern 
Europe.  
 Although tensions had arisen as a result of the fall-out from the Trade Reform Act 
denying the Soviet Union Most Favored Nation status, Ford executed his strategy of personal 
diplomacy in two lengthy meetings with Soviet leaders at Helsinki. In a joint press conference at 
the start of the CSCE, Ford and Brezhnev expressed their mutual hope that the conference would 
result in a more peaceful world. Ford said, “I believe that the peace in Europe will be enhanced” 
and “the overall peace of the world would be encouraged and broadened.”404 Similarly, Brezhnev 
said, “I want peace and tranquility to reign in Europe” and he adamantly added his desire that the 
nations of Europe not “interfere in each other’s domestic affairs.”405 To advance this peace, 
discussions between the two leaders centered on mutual balanced force reductions and progress 
toward a SALT II agreement. At their first meeting, Ford took the initiative and affirmed his 
commitment to halting the arms race. In a conciliatory declaration he stated, “I can tell you very 
                                                          
402
 Ford, Kissinger, and Ceausescu, Memorandum of Conversation, Bucharest, Romania, 2 August 1975, 1. 
403
 Ford, Kissinger, and Ceausescu, Memorandum of Conversation, Sinaia-Bucharest Train, 2 August 1975, 30-31. 
404
 Ford and Brezhnev, “Question and Answer Session,” Remarks, Helsinki, Finland, 30 July 1975, 2. 
405
 Ibid., 2. 
82 
 
forcefully I am committed to détente, and the American people agree with me.”406 He further 
stated, “I am confident as we talk about SALT II, we can achieve success in that area.”407 
Brezhnev agreed and believed the scope of their discussions should be expanded. He said, “We 
completed the European Security Conference. But we should not stop at that. Relaxation of 
tensions doesn’t stop with Europe, the U.S., and Canada.”408 Furthermore, Brezhnev affirmed, 
“We have an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. We both pledged to act in such a way 
as to prevent a nuclear war between us.”409 He even stated, “After this conference, it is morally 
more difficult to talk about increasing our armaments levels.”410  
 Despite this agreement on their joint commitment to détente and the importance of 
preventing military escalation, their meeting resulted in little progress toward a SALT II 
agreement. The Soviets granted a minor concession, agreeing that under the assumptions of 
missile counting, any missile placed in a MIRV location was a missile that had that capability.
411
 
And a tentative agreement was reached that limited airborne cruise missiles to 1,850 miles and 
submarine-based missiles to 375 miles.
412
 Ultimately however, the meetings in Helsinki 
concluded with a tense disagreement over the capabilities of the Soviet Backfire bomber.
413
 Both 
sides were forced to conclude that they were not anywhere near a SALT II agreement.
414
  
 However, Ford’s personal diplomacy was successful in negotiating an economic 
agreement. Europe and the Soviet Union in particular had suffered from a poor wheat harvest. In 
a top secret deal during their Helsinki meetings, Brezhnev agreed to a significant grain purchase 
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from the United States. In their final meeting, he said, “I want to say a few words on grain. You 
said you had no problem with the purchase of 10 million tons, but that this should not be made 
public.”415 Ford confirmed that there would be no problem. Brezhnev stunningly responded, “I 
realized that we have already bought 10 million, but we are prepared to go further and to 
purchase another 15 million.”416 Although Ford was unable to negotiate progress on SALT II, his 
economic grain deal helped to preserve his relationship with Brezhnev. Brezhnev expressed his 
support for Ford’s future political success. He confided, “I wish to tell you something 
confidentially and completely frankly that we in the Soviet leadership are supporters of your 
election as president to a new term as well. And we for our part will do everything we can to 
make that happen.”417 The collaborative relationship building strengths Ford had built as a Cold 
War hawk during his congressional career had enabled him to win the approval of his Soviet 
counterpart. 
Ford’s Helsinki Conference Leadership:  Speech to the Heads of State  
 To complement his strategy of personal diplomacy, Ford’s second leadership strategy at 
the Helsinki Conference was to deliver a strong personal message in a candid and authentic 
speech with integrity. Ford was never regarded as an engaging public speaker. However, he was 
at his best when he spoke from the foundation of his principles. His speech at the Helsinki 
Conference represented such an opportunity. The speech was important as it would be the most 
public display of this leadership at the conference. Kissinger told Ford his speech “will command 
worldwide attention.”418 Ford was disappointed with the tone of the first draft of his speech. As 
he pondered the accomplishments of the Helsinki accords, he decided that the overriding 
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objective of his speech would be to provide hope. He wrote in the margin of his draft, “Our 
people of all 35 countries want us to offer them hope. Their hopes have been raised by bilateral 
agreements but that Hope can be expanded, yes multiplied, by words at Helsinki and actions to 
implement and execute.”419 Finally, he scribbled, “Why not amplify HOPE which all want and 
put our actions aimed at that achievement.”420 He double underlined HOPE. 
 Ford delivered his speech on August 1, 1975 before the 34 other heads of state in 
attendance at the Helsinki Conference. He was twenty-sixth in the long schedule of speakers. He 
first began his Hope speech with an articulation of the participating nation’s dual needs for 
independence and lasting peace. He said, “We are bound together by the most powerful of ties, 
our fervent love for freedom and independence, which knows no homeland but the human 
heart.”421 But he acknowledged that this was difficult. He continued, “The nations assembled 
here have kept the general peace in Europe for thirty years, yet there have been too many narrow 
escapes from major conflict. There remains, to this day, the urgent issue of how to construct a 
just and lasting peace for all peoples.”422 The solution, he said, was to shift from confrontation to 
cooperation. We must move “away from confrontation and toward new possibilities for secure 
and mutually beneficial cooperation.”423 He pledged America’s partnership in this cooperative 
endeavor saying, “I have come to Helsinki as a spokesman for a nation whose vision has always 
been forward, whose people have always demanded that the future be brighter than the past, and 
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whose united will and purpose at this hour is to work diligently to promote peace and progress 
not only for ourselves but for all mankind.”424  
Second, Ford asserted that the promotion of peace required discipline and restraint in the 
relationships of the participating nations. He stated his belief that “Military competition must be 
controlled.”425 Furthermore he stated, “Political competition must be constrained. Crises must 
not be manipulated or exploited for unilateral advantages.”426 He declared his belief that the 
Helsinki accords offered a strong blueprint for this type of discipline. He said, “The documents 
produced here . . . reaffirm the basic principles of relations between states: non-intervention, 
sovereign equality, self-determination, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers and the 
possibility of change by peaceful means.”427 He warned this could not be the work of one nation 
as “Détente must be a two-way street. Tensions cannot be eased by one side alone. Both sides 
must want détente and work to achieve it. Both sides must benefit from it.”428  
Third, Ford articulated the benefits of such peaceful and cooperative relationships in the 
form of enhanced human rights. He said, “The documents produced here . . . affirm the most 
fundamental human rights, liberty of thought, conscience  and faith, the exercise of civil and 
political rights.
429
 Ford applauded the Helsinki agreement for the free movement of people and 
ideas with things like, “Cultural and educational exchange, family reunification, the right to 
travel and to marriage between nationals of different states – and for the protection of the 
priceless heritage of our diverse cultures.”430 To drive the point home to the Communist nations, 
Ford stated, “To the countries of the East . . . it is important that you recognize the deep devotion 
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of the American people and their government to human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
thus to the pledges that this conference has made regarding the freer movement of people, ideas, 
and information.” 431  
 Fourth, Ford articulated the benefits of peaceful and cooperative relationships in the form 
of economic free- exchange. Ford invoked his presence as indicative of America’s interest in 
Europe’s future. He said, “Our future is bound with yours. Our economic well-being as well as 
our security is linked increasingly with yours.”432 Ford stressed each of the facets of possible 
cooperation coming out of Helsinki from trade and industry to science and technology from the 
environment to space.
433
  
Finally, and most importantly, Ford appealed to the integrity of these world leaders. He 
issued a challenge to the participants to keep the promises made at Helsinki. He said, “The 
people of all Europe, and, I assure you, the people of North America a thoroughly tired of having 
their hopes raised and then shattered by empty words and unfulfilled pledges. We had better say 
what we mean and mean what we say, or we will have the anger of our citizens to answer.”434 
Ford stated, “We owe it to our children, to the children of all continents, not to miss any 
opportunity, not to malinger for one minute, not to spare ourselves or allow others to shirk in the 
monumental task of building a better and safer world.”435 In his determination to provide hope, 
Ford said, “there is now opportunity to turn our people’s hopes into realities.”436 And in his most 
famous line from the speech Ford said, “History will judge this conference not by what we say 
today, but by what we do tomorrow – not by the promises we make, but by the promises we 
                                                          
431
 Ford, “Remarks of the President of the United States before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in  
     Europe,” Speech, Helsinki, Finland, 1 August 1975, 46. 
432
 Ibid., 41. 
433
 Ibid., 32. 
434
 Ibid., 22. 
435
 Ibid., 7. 
436
 Ibid., 8. 
87 
 
keep.”437 He then looked Brezhnev in the eye while driving home that, “To my country, 
principles are not clichés or empty phrases. We take this work and these words very 
seriously.”438  
 At the conclusion of the Helsinki Conference, President Ford was pleased with the result. 
He had successfully supported the negotiations of important agreements such as human rights 
and talks on mutually balanced force reduction. He had made the decision to attend the 
conference in the face of strong opposition and in so doing had leveraged his personal diplomacy 
to strengthen relationships with his NATO allies, Eastern European leaders, and even Brezhnev. 
He had asserted American global leadership with integrity in his message of hope and his call for 
the participants to keep the promises they made in signing the Helsinki agreements. In explaining 
this success to his Cabinet upon his return he said, “There has been criticism of the meeting. But 
it bolstered the West and gave greater sense of independence to the Eastern European 
countries.”439 Overall, he said, “The meeting was a definite plus.”440 While Ford obviously 
understood that the outcome of the Helsinki Conference would have to be judged in the future, 
he believed that, “whether it is a long stride or a short step, it is at least a forward step for 
freedom.”441 
 Kissinger concurred with Ford’s positive assessment of the Helsinki Conference. He 
jubilantly declared, “It was the president who dominated the Conference, who took a triumphal 
tour through Eastern Europe – it was the president.”442 Kissinger would even say that American 
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relations were now “better than ever since the early Marshall Plan days.”443 He concluded that 
after the Helsinki Conference, “Anyone observing from another planet would not have thought 
Communism was the wave of the future.”444 While this was clear to Ford and Kissinger, there 
were many others who did not see it this way. For all of the work that Ford had put in to 
preparation and attending the conference, his fight to win popular and political support for the 
Helsinki accords was nowhere near complete.  
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Chapter 3:  
The Impact of Ford’s Leadership at the Helsinki Conference 
 
 President Ford attended the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and 
signed the Helsinki Final Act because he believed America’s leadership in this international 
event would advance his principle of achieving peace. The impact of the Helsinki Conference on 
this goal varied widely in the short term and the long term. In the short term, the Helsinki 
Conference proved politically damaging to Ford. Ford failed to craft a message to articulate the 
benefits of the Final Act. As a result, his image suffered a decline in the immediate aftermath of 
the conference. Furthermore, the Helsinki accords proved to be a liability in the 1976 presidential 
election. In the primaries, challenger Ronald Reagan vocally criticized President Ford’s 
involvement in the conference as deferential to the Soviet Union. In the general election, 
Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter criticized Ford for failing to advance human rights more 
forcefully. Ford himself allowed the conference to be a liability with a damaging mistake during 
the foreign policy debate where he inferred Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe in answer to a 
Helsinki accords question. However, Ford steadfastly held that the Helsinki Conference would 
have a positive impact on world peace over time. In the long run, it made an important 
contribution to the end of the Cold War when European leaders kept the promises their 
predecessors had made at Helsinki. The Final Act became a unifying motivation for East 
European dissidents in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union to obtain greater freedoms 
and rights. And after a decade and a half, the self-determination, non-interference, and human 
rights principles so carefully negotiated and signed in the Helsinki Final Act were invoked by 
world leaders to allow Germany to reunify and choose its own alliances.     
90 
 
The Helsinki Accords: Immediate Impact to Ford’s Image 
At the conclusion of the Helsinki Conference, President Ford and Secretary of State 
Kissinger declared the event a success. In private conferences, they articulated the benefits and 
rationale of the Final Act and of Ford’s personal diplomacy with Eastern European leaders. First, 
they articulated the political and human benefits. Ford explained to his Cabinet that the Final Act 
advanced global peace because it “specifies self-determination and peaceful change of 
borders.”445 Kissinger further stated that it held strong potential to advance human freedoms 
because “all the new things in the documents are in our favor – peaceful change, human 
contacts.”446 Second, they shared the benefit of the conference in improving foreign relations. In 
a meeting with National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Ford declared that as a result of his 
presence at the conference and support of the Final Act, he had received “more overtures from 
Eastern European countries than ever before.”447 Third, they explained why the Helsinki accords 
did not solidify Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. Ford reasoned to his Cabinet, that the 
existing “borders were settled by the treaty, most of them 30 years ago.”448 In a private meeting 
with Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, Kissinger was even more precise in articulating the 
history of European border settlement in defense of the border inviolability agreements in the 
Final Act. He flatly stated, “There were no unsettled frontiers in Europe.”449 He explained, “The 
Balkan frontiers were settled in 1946-47 in the peace conference in Paris. The Eastern frontier of 
Poland was settled at Yalta. The Western frontier of Poland was recognized by both German 
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states.”450 In private meetings, both Ford and Kissinger could clearly articulate the Helsinki 
Conference’s purpose and benefits.   
However, the Ford administration failed to clearly and convincingly articulate the 
benefits of the Helsinki Conference to the public, the media, and to Congress. Having never 
developed the skill of communicating a compelling vision and message, Ford did not leverage 
his media opportunities to do so in the immediate aftermath of his Helsinki trip. Ford recalled 
that the “Press reaction to the speech was uniformly generous” when the Los Angeles Times 
praised his conference remarks as “probably Ford’s most impressive speech.”451 From this 
praise, he concluded that his message “America still cares” had been communicated “loud and 
clear” to the European people. 452 But neither Ford nor Kissinger crafted a similarly ‘loud and 
clear’ message to the American people. Ford’s Helsinki Conference messages were nebulous and 
sweeping. At a press appearance with Brezhnev during the Conference, Ford vaguely stated, “I 
believe that the peace in Europe will be enhanced. I believe that the overall peace of the world 
will be encouraged and broadened, and it is my judgment that progress will be the net result.”453 
But he failed to clearly articulate how the Helsinki Final Act would accomplish that peace. In 
remarks to the press immediately following the conference he further vaguely stated, “I believe 
that some of the unfortunate things that have happened in the last 20 years in Europe will not 
happen again because of the signing of the CSCE and the speeches that were made there. Those 
kinds of unfortunate events can be avoided in the future. CSCE was a great plus.”454 Finally, in 
his remarks to the press upon returning to the United States he stated, “We will continue to 
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encourage full implementation of the principles embodied in the C.S.C.E. declarations until the 
1977 follow-up meeting to assess how well all the signatory states have translated these 
principles into concrete action for the benefit of their peoples and the common progress in 
Europe.”455 But he failed to communicate what those principles were or how the implementation 
would be enforced. None of these public statements convincingly articulated the benefits of the 
Helsinki accords in advancing peace and human freedoms, nor did they sufficiently address the 
direct opposition he had received from concerned parties prior to the conference.   
Even Ford’s own staff portrayed Helsinki negatively. NBC’s John Cochran reported, “Mr. 
Ford’s aides privately admit the agreement is modest.”456 Ford recalled, “The trouble was that 
some members of the White House staff didn’t view Helsinki as a significant accomplishment. In 
their comments to the press, they were defensive about it. They should have lauded the accord as 
a victory.”457 This may have been due to Kissinger’s failure to properly brief Ford’s staff. 
Kissinger was convinced that the success of détente was dependent on maintaining secrecy. As a 
result, he did not broadly communicate Helsinki’s meaning and importance which left the staff 
unable to rebut criticisms of Helsinki.
458
  
One particularly damaging staff remark was from Assistant Secretary of State Helmut 
Sonnenfeldt. Just five months after the Helsinki Conference, Sonnenfeldt told American 
diplomats in London that a “permanent organic union existed between the Soviet Union and its 
satellite countries.”459  The comment was leaked and when it was reported it was interpreted as 
the Ford administration’s acknowledgement of that an enduring Soviet domination over Eastern 
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Europe.
460
 This statement was labeled by the media as the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine and it infuriated 
politicians and Americans of Eastern-European descent.
461
 Sonnenfeldt later said he intended to 
assert that in the Ford administration’s foreign policy, “We wished the Eastern Europeans would 
be freer and more autonomous than they were, but that there was not much we could do about it 
at acceptable risk.”462 “What pained me about it particularly,” he said, “was that it caused so 
much pain and bad blood in communities in this country which have Eastern European roots.”463 
Additionally he said, “Our ubiquitous friends in the KGB picked this up very quickly and used it 
in Eastern Europe to try to disorient and demoralize people who had placed reliance on relations 
with the United States.”464  
As a result of the communication failures of Ford and his staff, Ford faced continued 
severe criticism for attending the Helsinki Conference. Criticism from the media was harsh. The 
press argued the Helsinki Conference was either irrelevant or unnecessarily advantageous to the 
Soviet Union. A  New York Times editorial scathingly stated, “Nothing signed in Helsinki will in 
any way save courageous free thinkers in the Soviet empire from the prospect of incarceration in 
forced labor camps, or in insane asylums, or from being subjected to involuntary exile.”465 Herb 
Kaplow of ABC reported, “As far as the U.S. foreign policy formulators are concerned, this is an 
opportunity we could have missed.”466 He further reported that Ford played a passive role saying, 
“But many of our European allies wanted this conference in varying degrees and so we appeared, 
with sort of a what-the-hell attitude, there’s nothing to lose and maybe something to gain.”467 
NBC’s Garrick Utley dismissed U.S. participation as deference to Brezhnev as part of détente. 
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He reported that Ford was signing the Helsinki accords “to humor Leonid Brezhnev. He’s had an 
obsession about this conference for many years.”468 Newsweek’s Moscow Correspondent Alfred 
Friendly reported, “Détente gives [the Soviets] a respectability they crave” and the Helsinki 
agreements could be “dangerous if it permits the Russians to appear respectable when in fact 
they don’t have any intention of behaving respectably.469” Correspondent Howard K. Smith 
unabashedly blasted the Helsinki accords as both irresponsible and hypocritical. He reported, “At 
the end of World War II the Russians flagrantly broke the Yalta Agreement with us and seized 
about half of Europe. Now, euphoric at hopes of détente, we’re about to sign an agreement in 
Helsinki making their breach of treaty and their conquest ‘inviolable.’ It seems incongruous that 
while we press Israel to give up some conquered Arab lands, we bless the Russians conquest of 
six times as much territory.”470  
Like the media, political opponents were critical of Ford’s participation at the Helsinki 
Conference. Both liberals and conservatives denounced Ford and Kissinger claiming that they 
had actually abandoned the cause of human rights.
471
 Conservative California Governor Ronald 
Reagan defiantly issued an announcement saying, “I think all Americans should be against it.”472 
Reagan asserted his belief that Ford’s appeasement of the Soviets would weaken America’s 
leadership position.
473
 Senator Henry Jackson gave a more forceful and more articulate critique 
of the accords, saying that Eastern Europe had been given away in exchange for human rights 
promises that were “so imprecise and so hedged as to raise considerable doubt about whether 
they can and will be seriously implemented.”474 The Polish-American Congress publicly 
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condemned the Final Act saying that, “the Soviet Union rarely, if ever, honored treaties, and the 
Helsinki accords implied that Western democracies accepted Soviet domination of East Central 
Europe and of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.”475 Even the Chinese denounced the accords 
claiming that the Soviets intended to use the documents to legitimize their claims in Europe and 
turn next to Asia.
476
 Ford’s lack of communication skills left him ill-equipped to rebut these 
statements.  
Without a clear, convincing message and in the face of such critical political and media 
opposition, Ford’s public image was damaged.  Ford recalled the mail he received upon returning 
from Helsinki “showed 122 letters condemning the accords; only eleven letters approved of what 
I had done.”477 Ford subsequently suffered a sharp decline in his approval ratings. According to 
the Sindlinger Report, Ford had an overall positive rating of 57 percent and an international 
positive rating of 67 percent in the two week period leading up to the Helsinki Conference.
478
  In 
the two week period following the conference, Ford’s overall approval positive rating dropped 
six points to 51 percent and his international positive rating dropped thirteen points to only 54 
percent.
479
 Similarly, Gallup poll data showed Ford’s overall approval rating had dropped from 
52 percent before the Helsinki Conference to only 45 percent after the conference.
480
 Presidential 
aide George Van Cleve concluded that, “The president suffered a decline in both his overall and 
his international ratings during the Helsinki period, and it appears that the trip plus the pact were 
at least partially responsible” because the Helsinki Conference “occurred during a period of 
relatively favorable economic news” domestically.481  
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The Ford administration’s public relations mistakes were widely acknowledged. Ford 
accepted the blame for America’s misunderstanding of the Helsinki accords. Ford said, “The 
well-meaning ethnic groups in this country simply didn’t understand our accomplishment. This 
was not a failure in substance. It was a failure in public relations, and I will have to accept a large 
share of the blame.”482 Likewise, Kissinger acknowledged that the administration did not 
sufficiently respond to early criticisms of the Helsinki Conference.
483
 He admitted to Ford that 
the Helsinki message was a complicated one. In a memo preparing Ford for the Conference, he 
wrote, “The West has a more complex story to tell: that CSCE achievements are modest, that the 
proof of the CSCE’s success lies in the future, and that a strong Allied defense posture is a 
precondition for security and future détente.”484 Even the Soviets recognized Ford’s 
communication failure. Dobrynin recalled, “The Ford administration never made [the Helsinki 
accords] clear to the American people, and his opponents exploited the resulting ambiguity in the 
public mind.”485  
The Soviets did not make the same mistake and proclaimed the Helsinki Final Act as a 
major victory. Kissinger acknowledged that the Soviets had a clear public relations opportunity 
to leverage the Helsinki agreements. In a memorandum to Ford, Kissinger wrote, “The solemnity 
of the occasion will favor the Soviet Union, as will the simplicity of the Soviet message – that 
peace has arrived.”486 Brezhnev agreed and zealously proclaimed the Helsinki Conference a 
success. Having worked for so long to advance the Conference on European Security and 
Cooperation, Brezhnev was quite anxious to claim a victory before the February 1976 
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Communist Party Congress.
487
 To broadly publicize his accomplishment, Brezhnev published the 
full text of the Helsinki Final Act in the Communist Party’s newspaper, Pravda.488 The Soviet 
public relations campaign was so successful a Czech dissident wrote, “The Helsinki summit has 
given its blessing to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe in exchange for the hope given to the 
Western heads of state that the USSR will not intervene in the course of events in the West.”489  
 Although he failed to convincingly communicate the benefits and rationale for the 
Helsinki accords, Ford consistently communicated his belief in its future impact. Fueled by this 
long term optimism, Ford defended the positive outcomes that could be obtained if the leaders 
acted upon principles they promised to uphold in signing the Final Act. Flying back from the 
conference in Air Force One he said, “I am absolutely confident, I am totally convinced, that 
because the 35 nations participating in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, 
Europe and the world are all better off. I will know two years from now whether our promises 
have been kept.
490
 Upon his return he stated with conviction, “We are on the right course and the 
course that offers the best hope for a better world. I will continue to steer a steady course because 
[the Helsinki] experience has further convinced me that millions of hopeful people, in all parts of 
Europe, still look to the United States of America as the champions of human freedom 
everywhere and of a just peace among the nations of the world.”491 He stressed that the proof of 
Helsinki’s success would have to be displayed through actions. The following September, Ford 
said of the Helsinki agreements, “The test is performance. I am optimistic and I believe that if we 
keep pressure on that we can say that Helsinki was a big plus.”492 Ford firmly believed that the 
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American people would come to see the long term benefits of the Helsinki accords in time. Ford 
acknowledged, “There was some criticism here,” but declared, “I think as the words and 
performance are seen and are better understood the reaction will be more and more positive.”493  
The Helsinki Accords: Short Term Impact on the 1976 Presidential Elections 
 Regardless of this long term optimism, the Helsinki accords were a short term liability to 
Ford’s bid for election in the 1976 presidential elections. The accords were problematic in both 
the primary and general elections. Only four months after the Helsinki Conference, Ronald 
Reagan called Ford to inform him of his intention to challenge him for the Republican 
nomination.
494
 Reagan purposefully attacked Ford’s foreign policy of détente as weakening 
America’s leadership position and criticized the Helsinki accords as an example. In a televised 
national address on March 31, 1976, Reagan characterized Ford’s foreign policy as “wandering 
without aim.”495 Reagan accused Ford of supporting the Soviet Union’s dominance over Eastern 
European nations. In a harshly critical tone, Reagan rhetorically asked “why Mr. Ford traveled 
halfway ‘round the world to sign the Helsinki Pact, putting our stamp of approval on Russia’s 
enslavement of the captive nations? We gave away the freedom of millions of people.”496 
Leveraging his ability to connect emotionally with his audience, Reagan encouraged Americans 
to, “Ask the people of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and all the 
others – East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, ask them – what it’s like to live in a world where the 
Soviet Union is Number One.”497 To underscore that this belief in Soviet appeasement was a 
theme that ran deeply throughout the Ford administration, Reagan cited Sonnenfelt’s 
misunderstood comments. He said, “Now we learn that another high official of the State 
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Department, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, has expressed the belief that, in effect, the captive nations 
should give up any claim of national sovereignty and simply become a part of the Soviet Union. 
He says, ‘Their desire to break out of the Soviet straightjacket’ threatens us with World War 
III.”498 He added for dramatic emphasis, “In other words, slaves should accept their fate.”499  
Ford was upset by Reagan’s criticism of his participation in the Helsinki accords. He 
believed there were employees at the Pentagon who leaked information to Reagan about the 
Helsinki negotiations and discussions with Soviet leaders that could be exaggerated.
500
 Provoked 
by Reagan’s barbed criticism, the Ford administration finally attempted to communicate the 
purpose of the Helsinki accords. Administration officials stated, “The president did not go to 
Helsinki to put the stamp of approval on Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. On the contrary, 
he went to Helsinki . . . to sign a document which contains Soviet commitments to greater 
respect for human rights, self- determination of peoples, and expanded exchanges and 
communication throughout Europe.”501 Furthermore, they stated, “With regard to the particular 
case of the Baltic States, President Ford stated clearly on July 25 that ‘the United States has 
never recognized that Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia’ and is not doing so 
now.”502 In direct response to the Sonnenfelt comment, they said, “Our official policy of non-
recognition is not affected by the results of the European Security Conference.”503  
But Reagan’s most damaging move came with a proposal to modify the foreign policy 
plank in the Republican platform. Reagan supporters designed and advanced a plank entitled 
“Morality in Foreign Policy.” The plank stated, “The goal of Republican foreign policy is the 
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achievement of liberty under law and a just and lasting peace in the world.”504 From there, the 
plank took direct aim at Ford’s participation in the Helsinki Conference. First, it lauded Soviet 
dissident and Helsinki opponent Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn stating, “We recognize and commend 
that great beacon of human courage and morality, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, for his compelling 
message that we must face the world with no illusions about the nature of tyranny. Ours will be a 
foreign policy that keeps this ever in mind.”505 Second, it critically called out the Helsinki 
accords by name declaring, “Agreements that are negotiated, such as the one signed in Helsinki, 
must not take from those who do not have freedom the hope of one day gaining it.”506 To avoid 
the infighting that could have cost him the nomination, Ford reluctantly agreed to support the 
platform. Dobrynin recalled that Ford’s actions infuriated Brezhnev. Brezhnev he said “was 
indignant at Ford and accused him of failing to take a position of peace candidate” which he felt 
“would have won over all honest Americans.”507  
 Reagan’s criticisms of the Helsinki Conference proved insufficient to cost Ford the 
nomination. After Reagan had announced his candidacy in November, he had led Ford 40 
percent to 32 percent in trial polls.
508
 After that point, Ford had eked out and maintained a 
narrow lead.
509
 At the Republican Convention Ford finally won the nomination in a very close 
vote. Ford earned 1,187 delegates to Reagan’s 1,070.510 However, the foreign policy and 
Helsinki Conference criticisms in the primary had been damaging. As a result, Ford’s overall 
approval rating dipped below 50 percent in the spring of 1976.
511
 Following the Republican 
                                                          
504
 “1976 Republican Platform,” Ford Presidential Library, http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/  
     platform/morality.htm. 
505
 Ibid. 
506
 Ibid. 
507
 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 369 and 371. 
508
 VanCleve to Gergen, “Factors Influencing Presidential Approval Ratings,” Memorandum, June 1976, 4. 
509
 Ibid., 5. 
510
 Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s, 319. 
511
 Jones, “Gerald Ford Retrospective,” Gallup News Service, 29 December 2006, Table.  
101 
 
convention, Ford trailed Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter 36 percent to 51 percent in August 
1976.
512
  
The Helsinki accords faced intensified criticism in the general election. Following 
Reagan’s lead, Carter harshly criticized the Ford administration’s foreign policy. In an address at 
the Council on Foreign Relations, Carter claimed that, “Our foreign policy is in greater disarray 
than at any time in recent history.”513 Additionally, he seized upon Ford’s communication 
weakness asserting in a TIME interview that, “Our foreign policy is without focus. It is not 
understood by the people, by the Congress or by foreign nations.”514 In a particularly barbarous 
comment, Carter dismissed Ford’s role in foreign policy altogether. He stated, “I don’t think the 
president plays any substantial role in the evolution of our foreign policy.”515  
Carter was equally and frequently critical of the Helsinki Conference. His criticisms 
focused on the perception that the Helsinki accords endorsed Soviet hegemony in Eastern 
Europe. In an interview with UPI, he declared, “At Helsinki, we signed an agreement approving 
the takeover of Eastern Europe. I would be very much tougher in the following years with the 
Soviet Union.”516 In a speech in Youngstown, Ohio he accusingly stated, “When we’ve had 
negotiations at Helsinki, we approved Russia’s takeover of Eastern Europe.”517 In an interview 
with U.S. News and World Report Carter declared, “We now have in Eastern Europe at least a 
tentative endorsement by our country of the domination of the region by the Soviet Union. They 
didn’t have that before the Helsinki accords. It was a very great diplomatic achievement for the 
Soviets to have our promise not to interfere in their control over Eastern Europe.”518 In an 
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interview with Capital Times, he bluntly concluded, “I think we lost in Helsinki. We ratified the 
takeover of Eastern Europe. We got practically nothing in return.”519 But one of Carter’s 
strongest attacks was to criticize Ford’s worldview of peace through strength. In his address to 
the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Carter said, “For too long, our foreign policy has 
consisted almost entirely of maneuver and manipulation, based on the assumption that the world 
is a jungle of competing national antagonisms, where military supremacy and economic muscle 
area the only things that work where rival powers are balanced against each other to keep the 
peace.”520  
Carter’s relentless attacks on Ford’s détente policy, his signing of the Helsinki Accords, 
and his peace through strength beliefs were brutal and led to a critical moment of the campaign. 
The second presidential debate in San Francisco focused on foreign policy and proved to have 
incredible significance for the 1976 Campaign. This was the first time since the 1960s that the 
presidential campaign featured televised debates.
521
 Ford admitted that “Foreign policy and 
national defense were my forte” and he therefore “failed to spend as much time preparing for the 
second debate as I should have.”522  
The televised foreign policy debate was moderated by New York Times associate editor 
Max Frankel and proved to be intense. At one critical moment, Carter reasserted his accusation 
that Ford was disengaged saying, “as far as foreign policy goes, Mr. Kissinger has been the 
president of this country. Mr. Ford has shown an absence of leadership and an absence of a grasp 
of what this country is and what it ought to be.”523 This comment put Ford on the defensive and 
resulted in an infamous gaffe regarding the Helsinki accords. Frankel asked Ford about détente 
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and the state of Soviet-American relations. Frankel first commented, “We virtually signed, in 
Helsinki, an agreement that the Russians have dominance in Eastern Europe.”524 Then he asked 
Ford, “Is that what you would call a two-way street of traffic in Europe?”525 Ford responded, “In 
the case of Helsinki, thirty-five nations signed an agreement, including the Secretary of State for 
the Vatican. I can’t under any circumstances believe that His Holiness the Pope would agree, by 
signing that agreement, that the thirty-five nations have turned over to the Warsaw nations the 
domination of Eastern Europe. It just isn’t true.”526 Ford had been briefed to avoid 
acknowledging the contentious Sonnenfelt Doctrine and so further stated, “There is no Soviet 
domination of Eastern Europe, and there never will be under a Ford Administration.”527 The 
dismayed Frankel countered, “Did I understand you to say, sir, that the Russians are not using 
Eastern Europe as their sphere of influence and occupying most of their  countries there and 
making sure with their troops that it’s a Communist zone?”528  
Ford’s mistake in the foreign policy debate was costly. The media criticisms of his 
statement that the Soviets did not dominate Eastern Europe were sharp. However, Ford initially 
refused to issue a clarification. Ford recalled, “I can be very stubborn when I think I’m right, and 
I just didn’t want to apologize for something that was a minor mistake.”529 But Ford’s Chief of 
Staff Richard Cheney urged him to clarify his position because he believed this mistake 
characterized Ford’s image as an intellectual light weight. Cheney recalled, “One of the reasons 
the second debate with Carter in San Francisco on foreign policy hurt so much was because it 
raised again the question of intellectual competence. The statement by the president that Poland 
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is not dominated by the Soviet Union was at the heart of the problem. It wasn’t the content of 
what he said so much as this impression that it created once again that he didn’t know Poland 
was dominated by the Soviet Union.”530 Ford’s Press Secretary Ron Nessen concurred. He 
recalled the mistake was particularly harmful because “it reinforced his bumbler image by 
making people thing [sic] not only that he was a physical bumbler, but that he also couldn’t think 
on his feet.”531 Ford finally agreed and issued a clarification after the debate. He said, “In the 
debate I spoke of America’s firm support for the aspiration of independence of the nations of 
Eastern Europe. The United States has never conceded – and never will concede – their 
domination by the Soviet Union. … It is our policy to use every peaceful means to assist 
countries in Eastern Europe in their efforts to become less dependent on the Soviet Union.”532  
But the damage had been done. Before the debate, Gallup polling showed Carter leading Ford by 
just two points, 47 percent to 45 percent.
533
 But after the debate, Carter’s lead widened to six 
points.
534
 Pollster George Gallup called Ford’s Helsinki gaffe the “most decisive moment in the 
campaign.”535  
 The 1976 election would go down to the wire. In an attempt to recover from his debate 
mistake and overtake Carter, the Ford campaign launched a $10 million advertising blitz and 
barnstormed through the swing states.
536
 The campaign race grew tighter. Gallup’s final pre-
election poll showed Ford and Carter to be in a statistical dead heat with 49 percent supporting 
Ford and 48 percent supporting Carter.
537
 A Harris poll gave Carter a slim lead of 46 percent to 
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45.
538
 In the election itself, Ford narrowly lost the popular vote 48 percent to 50 percent.
539
 In the 
Electoral College, the final tally was 240 for Ford to 297 for Carter.
540
 Numerous issues drove 
Ford’s loss, including the struggling American economy and Ford’s controversial pardon of 
Richard Nixon. However, in an election this close the relentless political attacks regarding his 
leadership at the Helsinki Conference and his communication mistake in the second debate were 
contributing factors. 
The Helsinki Accords: Long Term Impact on European Freedom & German Reunification 
Ford paid a steep personal political price for signing the Helsinki accords in the 1976 
presidential election. However, his enduring optimism of the long term success of the 
agreements proved to be well founded. Over the next decade and a half, the Helsinki accords 
would inspire citizens to pursue changes in the political structures of the Soviet Union and 
Eastern bloc nations. In addition to its publication in Pravda, the content of the Helsinki Final 
Act was broadcast into Eastern Europe by the BBC and Radio Free Europe.
541
 As the Helsinki 
Final Act was distributed and absorbed, it became “the manifesto of the dissident and liberal 
movement.”542 Helsinki motivated movements emerged most notably in Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
and the Soviet Union itself. Perhaps most dramatically, the Helsinki accords were an important 
compass guiding German reunification. By requiring its signatories to uphold human rights and 
self-determination, and encourage free trade during difficult economic times, the Helsinki 
accords were a powerful spark that contributed to the end of the Cold War.  
The Helsinki accords played an instrumental role in the Polish human rights movement. 
Poland’s Constitution was relatively protective of human rights and activists used that to find 
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ways to link Poland’s domestic policy to its international commitments.543 Five months after the 
Helsinki Conference, fifty-nine of Poland’s prominent non-government leaders wrote an open 
letter to the Speaker of the Polish Parliament demanding that the government practice the 
policies it had committed to in Helsinki.
544
 This demand was soon echoed by a powerful ally 
when the Catholic Church joined the protest and “the influential Secretariat of the Polish 
Episcopate declared that any constitutional reforms should be consistent with the principles of 
the Helsinki Final Act.”545 Poland’s human rights movement had become emboldened by the 
words and spirit of the Helsinki accords. 
 These demands severely challenged the Polish government in the face of the country’s 
economic problems. Polish Premier Edward Gierek found it difficult to balance the demand for 
greater human rights along with economic advancement. Economic issues like high oil prices, 
weak Polish exports, and an increasing debt all hurt the Polish government’s ability to ameliorate 
issues through price controls or other government involvement in the economy.
546
 Gierek’s 
advisors encouraged him to restrain consumption while also improving Western relations in the 
hope that the economic assistance would spark the economy.
547
 In the upheaval that followed, 
workers began to strike. A new group called the Committee in Defense of Human and Civil 
Rights formed, with its name specifically inspired by Helsinki’s Final Act.548 Despite the fact 
that he had criticized the Helsinki accords, President Carter visited Warsaw in 1977 and 
endorsed the movement to monitor the Helsinki compliance movement of the new Committee.
549
 
And as the movement gained momentum, the newly elected Pope John Paul II celebrated a 1979 
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mass in Warsaw with a crowd of 250,000 who waved a banner that proudly read, “Freedom, 
independence, and human rights.”550  
 Bolstered by this spirit of freedom and continued economic oppression, workers’ unions 
created a powerful force for change in Poland. Angered by the government’s ill-conceived 
economic policy, workers across the nation went on strikes.
551
 On August 14, 1980, activist Lech 
"Walesa announced the formation of the first independent and self-governing trade union ever in 
the Marxist-Leninist world” called Solidarity.552 In light of such widespread dissent, the Polish 
government made an unprecedented decision. It agreed to recognize Walesa’s independent trade 
union.
553
 In the months that followed, almost one-third of Poland’s population joined 
Solidarity.
554
 In 1981, Communist supporters called for a Soviet invasion to put down the Polish 
workers’ movement. But in an uncharacteristic respect for the Helsinki accord’s principle of non-
intervention, KGB leader Yuri Andropov informed the Soviet Politburo, “We don’t intend to 
introduce troops into Poland.”555  He said, “Even if Poland falls under the control of ‘Solidarity,’ 
that is the way it will be.”556 Following this decision, emboldened activists created the Polish 
Helsinki Committee in early 1982 to monitor and report human rights abuses of the Polish 
government.
557
 Finally, Communist rule in Poland collapsed. In May 1990, free elections were 
held and the Solidarity leaders replaced Communist leaders in what was the “first break in the 
Iron Curtain in more than forty years.”558 Though it took fifteen years, the Helsinki accords 
played an inspirational role in establishing democracy in Poland. 
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 Like Poland, Czechoslovakia followed a painful but rewarding Helsinki inspired path to 
political transformation. Immediately after the Helsinki Conference, activists saw the Final Act 
as an opportunity to have an open dialogue with the government that had not been possible since 
the Soviet invasion in the 1968 Prague Spring.
559
 Czechoslovakian protestors sent hoards of 
petitions for domestic reforms and international supervision.
560
 However, a Czechoslovakian 
activist band named Plastic People of the Universe was arrested in 1976 and put on trial.
561
 Their 
controversial trial inspired 242 people to sign a document called Charter 77 which demanded the 
Czechoslovakian government to uphold the free expression principles it had signed at the 
Helsinki Conference in 1975.
562
 The Charter 77 document stated that important Czechoslovakian 
laws were confirmed in Helsinki in 1975 and “from that date our citizens have the right, and our 
state the duty, to abide by them.”563  
The Czechoslovakian government struggled with its response to Charter 77. Soviet 
advisors rushed in and as a result many of the leaders of Charter 77 were interrogated and 
arrested.
564
 One detainee was playwright Vaclav Havel who used his prison time to write essays 
and plays that encouraged citizens to change the system by “developing standards for the 
individual behavior apart from those of the state.”565 The U.S. State Department abandoned its 
policy of non-intervention and strongly condemned the arrests as a failure to uphold the Helsinki 
principles.
566
 Given this strong international response, Charter 77 dissidents, along with activists 
from a new group called the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted, continued to 
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document and communicate human rights violations to Helsinki review conferences.
567
 Their 
persistence finally paid off. On June 9, 1990, Czechoslovakians held elections in which the Civic 
Forum coalition won parliamentary control.
568
  
 Although Brezhnev and Gromyko had been sure that their hard fought non-intervention 
clause would protect them from outside pressure to reform their human rights policies, the 
Helsinki accords even inspired change within the Soviet Union itself. Dobrynin recalled that 
Brezhnev did not believe the human rights principles in the Helsinki accords “would not bring 
much trouble inside the country. But he was wrong.”569 He went on to admit that while “the 
condition of Soviet dissidents did not change overnight, they were encouraged by this historic 
document” in a way that was “totally beyond the imagination of Soviet leadership.”570  
Like those in Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Helsinki inspired human rights movement 
in the Soviet Union began within a year of the signing of the accords. In the weeks that followed 
the Helsinki Conference, a group of Soviet dissidents courageously met with visiting U.S. 
congressional leaders. The dissidents “expressed their hope that the West would hold the 
Kremlin accountable for its commitments under the Final Act.”571 Emboldened by the 
enthusiastic response from these congressional leaders, the Group to Promote the 
Implementation of the Helsinki accords was formed in Moscow and endorsed by popular 
dissident, physicist Andrei Sakharov.”572 Similar Helsinki Groups emerged in the Ukraine, 
Georgia, Armenia, and Lithuania.
573
 Soviet leadership surprisingly permitted the existence of 
these groups. This unprecedented acceptance appeared to be motivated by economic 
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considerations. The Soviet economy had declined in 1976 and Soviet leadership counted on the 
Western trade expansion promoted by Basket Two of the Helsinki agreements for recovery.
574
  
 However, ten years after the Helsinki Conference the human rights record in the Soviet 
Union had shown little improvement. As with their Eastern bloc neighbors, prominent members 
of the Helsinki Groups in Moscow, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Georgia were arrested and 
imprisoned in 1978.
575
 Many more were arrested in the years that followed. At the tenth 
anniversary Helsinki Conference, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz made a bold speech 
condemning the Soviet human rights record. He warned that, “Tensions will exist so long as 
some persist in violating the most fundamental human rights. Pious declarations are cheap. Real 
progress can only be seen in its effect on human beings.”576 Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze angrily retorted, “Our country has not allowed and will not allow anyone to 
intervene in internal affairs.”577 Brezhnev’s non-interference principle remained firmly in place.  
But by the mid-1980s, a number of Soviet leaders including Mikhail Gorbachev aspired 
to reform the Soviet government. Many of Gorbachev’s early supporters still wanted internal 
economic reform with the kind of trade with the West encouraged in the Helsinki agreements.
578
 
Gorbachev was thus attracted to the Helsinki agreements and “the potential opportunities for a 
pan-European policy which lay in the spirit of Helsinki.”579  
Gorbachev put his aspirations into concrete action. First, he informed Secretary of State 
George Schultz that he was prepared to discuss human rights at an upcoming Soviet-American 
summit.
580
 Second, Gorbachev released Soviet political prisoners. He immediately released a 
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third of the Soviet Union’s political prisoners, including Andrei Sakharov.581 In 1987 and 1988, 
the Soviets freed a total of 600 political prisoners.
582
 Third, in order to win support from Europe 
and the rest of the West, Gorbachev approved unprecedented levels of international human rights 
monitoring. The Kremlin accepted human rights focused visits of foreign judges, prosecutors, 
and psychiatrists.
583
 In September of 1987, Soviet ambassador Yuri Kashlev stated that the 
Soviets would allow the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights to visit the Soviet 
Union.
584
 Finally, and most startlingly, he allowed two Soviet groups known as Perestroika ‘88 
and the Democracy and Humanism Seminar to create the first Soviet opposition political party, 
the Democratic Union.
585
 The Reagan administration, always a harsh critic of Moscow, 
cautiously approved. The official statement read, “At home, the Soviet leadership’s campaign for 
more [openness] and democratization continued to improve the opportunities for Soviet citizens 
to express their views, both in the official media and through unofficial organizations and 
publications.”586 These collective changes led by Gorbachev were significantly influenced by the 
economic and human rights principles outlined in the Helsinki accords. However, the most 
visible impact of the Helsinki accords on Soviet attitude and behavior came in response to the 
movement in Germany. 
 One of the most monumental events marking the end of the Cold War was the 
reunification of Germany. The Helsinki accords played a significant and visible role in this 
historic event. East German citizens learned of the freedom of movement principle in the 
Helsinki accords through radio and churches. As a result, approximately 100,000 East Germans 
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applied for exit visas in the year following the Helsinki Conference.
587
 To encourage this 
momentum, Dr. Karl-Heinz Nitschke created a human rights petition to insist that the East 
German government uphold the principles it had signed in Helsinki and in 1985 activists founded 
the Initiative for Peace and Human rights.
588
  
The demand for the freedom of movement embodied in the Helsinki accords peaked in 
1989. In September, about six thousand East Germans on vacation in Hungary illegally entered 
Austria and went to the West German embassy to seek asylum.
589
 Citing its commitment to the 
Helsinki agreements, as well as the U.N. Convention on Refugees, Hungary officially opened its 
borders to Austria to legalize this emigration.
590
 East German General Secretary Eric Honecker 
resigned as protest demonstrations escalated.
591
 With Gorbachev’s encouragement his successor, 
Egon Krenz, announced that East Germans could freely travel to the West.
592
 On November 9, 
the Berlin Wall fell. President Bush endorsed this decision to honor the Helsinki agreements. In a 
press conference he said, “I welcome the decision by the East German leadership to open the 
borders to those wishing to emigrate or travel. And this, if it’s implemented fully, certainly 
conforms with the Helsinki Final Act which the German Democratic Republic signed.”593 He 
continued, “It’s the kind of development that we have long encouraged by our strong support for 
the Helsinki Final Act.
594” When asked by reporters if he ever imagined anything like this 
happening, Bush honestly replied that he didn’t foresee it, but “We’ve imagined it.”595  
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Throughout these historic European events, Gorbachev honored the Helsinki accords. As 
demonstrations spread across Germany and the Eastern bloc nations, he supported the non-use of 
force principle outlined in the Helsinki accords and urged his counterparts to do the same.
596
 
Pavel Palazchenko of the Soviet Foreign Ministry recalled, “Gorbachev was encouraging 
reforms, definitely. And he believed and said that if we wanted change in our country, if we 
wanted to abandon the old system in our country, how could we inhibit or prohibit change in our 
neighbors?”597 In fact, at the Malta summit with President Bush in December 1989, Gorbachev 
specifically requested that the democracy movement sweeping across Eastern Europe be 
communicated as consistent with the principles of the Helsinki accords, rather than Western 
values.
598
 Bush supported this request. According to Condoleeza Rice, Bush’s Soviet expert on 
the National Security Council, the president “was determined that no one was going to feel 
defeated.”599  
Soon after the Berlin Wall was torn down, the reunification of Germany was initiated 
under the principles of the Helsinki accords. On February 2, 1990 West German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl declared, “The question of German unity is a question of the right of self-
determination. All peoples of this Earth have the right of self-determination. . . . It corresponds to 
the principles of the CSCE.”600 As reunification talks moved forward, the controversial question 
that followed was which alliance the unified Germany would join. Gorbachev recalled, “I said 
we want Germany to be neutral. That was our original position that we proposed. This was a 
subject of very passionate debate.”601 The Helsinki accords determined the outcome. Rice 
                                                          
596
 Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 250. 
597
 Qtd., “The Presidents: G.H.W. Bush,” American Experience, PBS Documentary, 2012. 
598
 Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 251. 
599
 Qtd., “The Presidents: G.H.W. Bush,” American Experience, PBS Documentary, 2012. 
600
 Bush, “Remarks at Joint News Conference Following Discussions with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal  
     Republic of Germany,” Washington, D.C., 25 February 1990.  
601
 Qtd., “The Presidents: G.H.W. Bush,” American Experience, PBS Documentary, 2012. 
114 
 
recalled during the negotiations, “President Bush said, ‘Of course the Helsinki accords we all 
signed in 1975 allowed that any state in Europe can choose its alliances. So once there’s a 
unified Germany, it can choose its alliances.’ And Gorbachev said, ‘That’s right.’”602 At a press 
conference, Bush summarized their joint stance and stated, “I believe, as do Chancellor Kohl and 
the members of the alliance that the united Germany should be a full member of NATO. 
President Gorbachev, frankly, does not hold that view. But we are in full agreement that the 
matter of alliance membership is in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act, a matter for 
Germans to decide.”603 On October 3, 1990 the German people voted to reunify and ultimately to 
join the NATO alliance.
604
 In that same year, the Communist Party “renounced its leading role” 
in the Soviet Union and opposition parties won semi-free elections in Moscow and Leningrad.
605
  
 Fifteen years after President Ford attended the controversial Helsinki Conference, the 
promises made in the Final Act to promote peaceful self-determination and human rights were 
finally kept. Communism had collapsed and the Cold War had come to an end. When asked in a 
1991 interview if any of his policies had gained more respect with time, Ford cited the Helsinki 
accords. He recalled, “You will remember the hell we caught from Reagan and all kinds of 
individuals and organizations that said it was wrong to participate. Well, the Helsinki accords I 
honestly believe were a major factor in bringing about the human rights revolt in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia . . . and current ramifications in the Soviet Union.”606 President Bush frequently 
consulted Ford on foreign policy matters and had secured telephones placed in Ford’s home.607 
While records of their conversations are not available, it is not inconceivable that they discussed 
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these events which Ford had not foreseen, but had also imagined, as he signed the Helsinki 
accords in 1975.     
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Conclusion: 
The Promises We Keep: Legacy of President Ford’s Leadership at the Helsinki Conference 
 
 As he reflected on his values to write his memoirs, Gerald Ford took a blue ball point pen 
and wrote on the top of a yellow legal pad, “My Definition of a Statesman as Opposed to a 
Politician.”608 He wrote that a politician as one who “is interested in the next election” in contrast 
to a statesman who is “concerned about the next generation.”609 Ford further penned his 
optimistic belief that, “A statesman is one who believes in the ultimate good judgment of the 
American people and therefore takes the position that if all the facts are known he will survive 
the next election & the nation will be better off.”610 By his own definition, Ford’s leadership at 
the Helsinki Conference was that of a statesman. In the short term, his failure to communicate 
the facts and benefits of the Helsinki agreements to ensure the “good judgment of American 
people” would prevail resulted in severe criticism and a failed bid for election in 1976. However, 
his courageous decision to attend the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and 
sign the Helsinki Final Act contributed to the peaceful advancement of human rights and self-
determination when the next generation of leaders kept the promises their predecessors had made 
in Helsinki. Though he didn’t count it among his top achievements as he left the oval office, 
fifteen years later Ford cited the Helsinki accords as one of his administration’s greatest 
accomplishments.
611
 “The longer time passes,” Ford reflected, “the better the Helsinki accords 
appear.”612  
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 President Ford brought to the Helsinki accords the leadership beliefs, strengths, and 
weaknesses he had developed throughout his formative WWII military, congressional, and vice 
presidential experiences. First, he brought his internationalist belief that America must play a 
visible leadership role in world affairs. This belief began during his WWII naval service in the 
Pacific and earned him his first seat in the House of Representatives when he ran on an 
internationalist platform. Throughout his nearly twenty five years in the House, Congressman 
Ford supported America’s international leadership initiatives to promote global freedom and 
contain Communism. His consistent support spanned the initial proposal for NATO, the Korean 
War, the Vietnam War, and funding for efforts such as Radio Free Europe during the Cold War. 
Second, he developed his belief that world peace could best be achieved through America’s 
military strength. As a long term member of the Appropriations Defense Sub-Committee and the 
Intelligence Sub-Committee on Appropriations, Ford developed a detailed understanding of 
defense initiatives and consistently supported spending to maintain America’s military 
superiority. As his peace through strength stance solidified, Ford co-authored the Republican 
Party’s Vietnam War position, emphasizing the importance of containment through authoritative 
military action. His personal visits abroad to China, Korea, Vietnam, and Japan further 
convinced him of the importance of meeting the increased military strength of the Soviets. 
 In addition to these firmly held beliefs, Ford developed several leadership strengths 
throughout his career that served him well at the Helsinki Conference. The first strength was 
courage in the face of opposition. Ford boldly faced the old guard to challenge Charles Halleck 
to win the role of House Minority Leader and resolutely supported the moderate Eisenhower for 
president while facing threats from constituents to challenge his seat with a more conservative 
candidate. In perhaps his boldest show of courage as a congressman, Ford withstood personal 
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attacks while denouncing what he believed was President Johnson’s timid strategy in Vietnam. 
The second strength Ford built was collaboration through relationship building. He built strong 
relationships with his constituents in Michigan and with his congressional colleagues as he won 
partisan respect and support for his work on the Appropriations Sub-Committees. He further 
refined this skill as Minority Leader building coalitions to advance President Nixon’s agenda. 
But the hallmark strength he built over his career was his unquestionable integrity. In his vice 
presidential confirmation proceedings, Ford authorized full access to the financial, medical, 
political, and personal records that spanned his entire career. He emerged from this 
unprecedented evaluation of a public servant’s integrity with a spotless record.  
  However, Ford failed to develop a strength that could have significantly minimized the 
short term personal price he paid for his leadership at the Helsinki Conference. Throughout his 
career, he failed to hone the strength of inspirational communication. This was due to several 
factors. First, the detailed budget work of his Appropriations Committees did not demand 
inspirational communication. Second, Ford allowed himself to be overshadowed by more 
outgoing and engaging politicians such as Senate Minority leader, Ev Dirkson. Third, the attacks 
he received from President Johnson reinforced his image as poor communicator. Finally, Ford 
was so popular in his district, that he easily won reelection without the need to build the strong 
communication skills typically developed during campaigns. 
Equipped with these beliefs, strengths, and key weakness developed over his military and 
political career, Gerald Ford unexpectedly ascended to the presidency upon the resignation of 
Richard Nixon in 1974. He entered the oval office during a time of crisis. The nation was facing 
its worst economic deterioration since the Great Depression and had lost faith in its government 
leaders due to the presidential dishonesty during the Vietnam War and Watergate scandal. While 
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he faced pressure to address America’s domestic crises, Ford was determined to restore 
America’s leadership in the world through his assertive foreign policy. He faced significant 
headwinds as he sought to accomplish this goal. The American public had become increasingly 
isolationist, the media had become critical, and Congress had become increasingly involved in 
foreign affairs. However, there emerged a heightened demand for morality in government. Under 
these challenging circumstances, Ford decided to play a leadership role in the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe.  
 Ford’s leveraged his leadership beliefs and strengths throughout his work at the Helsinki 
Conference. First, he utilized his collaborative relationship building to complete the negotiations 
of human rights and peaceful border settlement into the Final Act with the reluctant Soviets. 
Additionally, he negotiated arms reduction talks with the Soviets in exchange for his personal 
attendance at the conference.  Second, Ford displayed courage in the face of fierce opposition 
and criticism from the media, Congress, and Americans of East European descent who all feared 
the Helsinki Final Act solidified the Soviet Union’s domination of Eastern Europe. Third, Ford 
used his relationship building strengths in the visible, personal diplomacy he conducted in his 
meetings with the Eastern bloc leaders of Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, as 
well as with his Western European allies. Finally, Ford demonstrated his integrity in his speech 
at the conference. Ford was able to “amplify hope” for a more peaceful world and deliver a 
compelling call to action for the signatory nations to keep the promises of peace, equality, 
freedom, and human rights espoused in the Helsinki accords.  
Despite his success during the conference, Ford failed to clearly communicate the 
purpose, importance, and benefits of the Helsinki agreements to the American people. He 
admittedly underestimated the importance of this communication and missed several public 
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relations opportunities at press conferences to do so. Instead, the Helsinki Final Act became a 
Soviet propaganda victory and Ford drew criticism from Congress and the media at home. In the 
immediate aftermath of the conference, Ford’s approval ratings dropped. The Helsinki accords 
then became a major liability during the presidential elections of 1976. Ronald Reagan 
challenged Ford in the 1976 Republican primaries and used Helsinki as a major point of attack. 
Jimmy Carter similarly attacked Ford for his role in Helsinki during the general election. But 
Ford’s communication weakness again proved disastrous when in the foreign policy debate with 
Carter when he was asked a question about the Helsinki agreements and unintentionally 
insinuated that the Soviet did not dominate Eastern Europe. The media criticism continued. In 
part fueled by this criticism, Ford narrowly lost the election.  
 Though Ford paid a steep political price for his role at the Helsinki Conference in the 
short term, the Final Act ultimately had a positive long term impact European freedom. In the 
aftermath of the Helsinki Conference, the Final Act became an inspirational document that 
inspired many East European dissident movements. In Poland, the human rights promises in the 
Helsinki Final Act, coupled with economic repression, motivated workers to unite and 
successfully oppose their Communist government. In Czechoslovakia, the Helsinki Final Act 
inspired dissidents to author Charter 77 which demanded that the government deliver on the 
human rights promises it had signed. In the Soviet Union, the principles of the Helsinki accords 
were embraced by emerging leaders such as President Mikhail Gorbachev to shape the economic 
and political transformation of the Soviet Union. Most impressively, the self-determination and 
free movement principles of the Helsinki Final Act were invoked by President Bush and 
President Gorbachev to nurture the peaceful reunification of Germany and the right of the 
German people to join the alliance of their choice. Through this historic lens, Ford’s actions at 
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Helsinki are viewed much more favorably. In fact, Ford’s approval rating has improved from the 
dismal average of only 47 percent during his presidency to 60 percent in recent years.
613
 As Ford 
had predicted in his 1975 speech in Helsinki, history did indeed judge the Helsinki accords by 
the promises its signatories had made. 
 Today, the United States faces an eerily similar situation to that faced by President Ford 
during his presidency. As in 1974, the American economy is struggling. Today’s economy is 
characterized by sluggish growth and relatively high unemployment following the crippling 
recession that began in 2008. Also reminiscent of 1974, the nation faces a crisis of confidence in 
its political leaders. Sparked by controversies such as the growing national debt, the federal debt 
ceiling, and the national healthcare law, American’s trust in government leaders is failing.614  
Trust in the executive branch currently stands at only 51 percent with trust in the legislative 
branch at only 34 percent.
615
 But perhaps most troublingly, there is evidence of a reemerging 
Cold War.   
The United States and Russia are once again embroiled in a political controversy 
regarding the rights of a sovereign nation. Ukraine is a former republic of the Soviet Union and 
includes a region known as the Crimean Peninsula. The Crimean Peninsula has a majority 
Russian ethnic population and was part of Russia until the Soviet Union transferred control of 
the territory to the Ukrainian Republic in 1954.
616
 With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
1991, the Crimean Peninsula remained with the newly independent nation of Ukraine.
617
 In the 
past several months, a popular revolt erupted when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych 
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rejected a European Union trade agreement in favor of strengthening ties to Russia.
618
 The revolt 
escalated and resulted in the removal of Yanukovych from office in February 2014.
619
 This 
ouster prompted Russian President Vladimir Putin to deploy troops to the Crimean Peninsula.
620
 
During this military occupation, Putin held a referendum from which he claims 97 percent of the 
Crimean people voted to join Russia.
621
 Following this referendum Russian President Vladimir 
Putin announced his annexation of Crimea.
622
 A Russian flag now flies on the roof of the City 
Hall in Bakhchysarai in central Crimea.
623
 
The annexation of Crimea by Russia has ignited a Cold War style controversy in the 
international community. Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsnyuk was outraged and called 
the annexation “a robbery on an international scale.”624 Ukrainian member of Parliament, Petro 
Poroshenko echoed this sentiment saying the Ukraine is now at “the beginning of a very 
dangerous conflict, and we should do our best to stop this process.”625 Western nations are 
aligned in their condemnation of Russia’s actions. British Prime Minister David Cameron 
declared that the annexation delivered “a chilling message across the continent of Europe.”626 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel called the move “a violation of international law.”627 
President Obama criticized Putin’s actions saying it was inappropriate for Russia to threaten 
Ukraine militarily and “because you’re bigger and stronger, [take] a piece of the country.”628 He 
further stated, “That is not how international law and international norms are observed in the 21st 
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century.”629 Russian leaders disagree and justify the actions as necessary to protect Crimean 
citizens from the illegitimate new government in Ukraine. Putin told the Politburo that the 
Crimean referendum to join Russia resulted in “a very convincing figure” and further declared 
that, “In our hearts, we know Crimea has always been an inalienable part of Russia.”630 Mikhail 
Gorbachev concurs and supports the annexation saying it “should be welcomed and not met with 
the announcement of sanctions.”631 
The response of both sides echoes Cold War actions and has further escalated the tension. 
The United States Congress has approved a $1 billion line of credit to support the troubled new 
Ukrainian government.
632
 The industrialized G7 nations have agreed to meet without Russia.
633
 
Additionally, President Obama announced sanctions that freeze the assets and restrict the travel 
of a select group of Putin advisors.
634
 In issuing these sanctions, Obama stated, “We’re making it 
clear that there are consequences for [Russia’s] actions.”635 However, the sanctions did not target 
high level Russian leaders and were therefore “met with derision and even mockery in 
Moscow.”636 Since the annexation, Putin has amassed more troops along the Ukrainian border. 
United States officials believe there could be approximately 40,000 troops there based on 
satellite imagery.
637
 Western nations are concerned that Russia may intend to use these troops to 
overtake more of Ukraine and other former republics such as Moldova.
638
 On the morning of 
March 28, 2014, President Putin called President Obama to discuss diplomatic solutions.
639
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 The Helsinki Final Act and President Ford’s leadership example provide a valuable 
framework to guide this contemporary diplomatic discussion. When they signed the Final Act, 
both the United States and the Soviet Union promised to resolve disputes peacefully. They 
agreed to recognize the sovereign equality of nations like Ukraine, regardless of size or political 
belief. Similarly, they agreed each nation has the right to self-determination of its political, 
economic, and social systems without intervention into its internal affairs. Furthermore, they 
agreed that border disputes would be resolved peacefully and without the use or threat of force. 
Under the Helsinki accords, the people of Ukraine have been promised the right to determine 
their own future. In conducting their diplomatic discussions to this end, today’s leaders would be 
wise to follow President Ford’s leadership example. Their discussions would be most productive 
if conducted in a spirit of collaborative compromise, courage, and integrity. Critically, they must 
avoid Ford’s communication failures. Each leader must communicate honest and compelling 
messages to their citizens explaining the long term benefits of negotiating this crisis peacefully, 
rather than through the use of threats and force. The contemporary controversy in Ukraine could 
be successfully resolved by following the framework of the historic Helsinki accords and 
President Ford’s personal leadership example. Like President Ford, today’s leaders would do 
well to uphold the promises their countries have made and act as not as politicians, but as global 
statesmen.  
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